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Ending impunity for perpetrators of serious international crimes such
as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is considered
important because convictions may achieve justice and deter future acts.
A controversial tool for ending impunity is the exercise of universal juris-
diction by states.  For its supporters, universal jurisdiction denies safe
havens for perpetrators of heinous offenses and ensures that their crimes
do not go unpunished due to a lack of will or means.  In contrast, critics
warn that universal jurisdiction threatens international relations, inter-
national justice, and the rights of the accused.
The recent resistance of the African Union to attempted prosecutions of
nationals of A.U. member states on the basis of universal jurisdiction
highlights the controversy surrounding the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion.  Through an analysis of the African Union reaction, this Article
examines and assesses the arguments in favor and against universal
jurisdiction, and proposes how a proper balance may be struck between
enforcement of international criminal law on the basis of universal juris-
diction and respect for state sovereignty.
This Article argues that, under international law, states have the
right to exercise universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes.
Rather than disregarding international justice, such prosecutions may
achieve justice by imposing individual responsibility for serious interna-
tional crimes.  It is undeniable, however, that difficulties may accom-
pany the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  Although there may be few
legal restrictions on its use, states should adopt a balanced approach
that makes universal jurisdiction a useful tool for ending impunity
while minimizing the risks associated with its exercise.  Ultimately, an
international agreement may be required to resolve the outstanding disa-
greement among states surrounding the doctrine; until then, states
should implement universal jurisdiction legislation and exercise it with
care.
* Associate, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP.  LL.M. 2011, University of Cambridge;
LL.B. 2009, University of Ottawa; M.A. (International Affairs) 2009, Carleton University;
B.A. 2004, Saint Mary’s University; B.Sc. 2004, Saint Mary’s University.  This Article is based
largely upon a thesis submitted as a partial requirement of the LL.M. program at the Uni-
versity of Cambridge.  The author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of Dr.
Roger O’Keefe, who acted as her thesis supervisor.  The opinions expressed in this Article
are solely those of the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION: RECONCILING ACCOUNTABILITY AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
“Never again.”  In response to the horrors of the holocaust dur-
ing World War II, this declaration symbolizes the commitment that
humanity should be protected from similar atrocities.1  Despite the
commitment, the vow was repeated after the 1994 Rwandan geno-
cide, during which an estimated 800,000-1,000,000 Tutsi were
killed.2  Ending impunity for perpetrators of international crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is often
considered integral to realizing this commitment because convic-
tions may achieve justice and deter future acts.  A controversial tool
1. See, e.g.,  Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, Remarks of the President at
the Presentation of the Final Report of the President’s Commission on the Holocaust,
appended to COMM’N ON THE HOLOCAUST, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Appendix G (Sept. 27,
1979), available at http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/languages/en/06/01/
commission/.
2. Never Again, OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON THE RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE UNITED
NATIONS,  http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/neveragain.shtml (last visited
Dec. 20, 2011); Rwandan Genocide, WORLD WITHOUT GENOCIDE, http://worldwithoutgeno-
cide.org/past-genocides/rwandan-genocide (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\43-3\JLE302.txt unknown Seq: 3 16-FEB-12 12:59
2011] Universal Jurisdiction 421
for ending impunity is the exercise of universal jurisdiction3 by
states.4  For its supporters, universal jurisdiction denies safe havens
for perpetrators of heinous offenses and ensures that their crimes
do not go unpunished due to a lack of will or means.5  In contrast,
critics warn that universal jurisdiction threatens international rela-
tions, international justice, and the rights of the accused.6  This
debate highlights the difficulties of holding individuals criminally
accountable in a historically state-centric system.7  At the heart of
this debate is a clash between principles of international law:8 the
foundational principle of sovereign equality and the right of states
to be free from external interference in their internal affairs on
one hand,9 and the more recent principle of individual responsibil-
ity for international crimes on the other.10
This conflict is most apparent when a state attempts to hold
another state’s head of state or other high-ranking official account-
able for international crimes.  In such circumstances, sovereign
3. “Exercise of universal jurisdiction” is used in this Article to describe the enforce-
ment of a state’s criminal law based on the universality principle.  This Article focuses on
universal jurisdiction in international criminal law, although some states provide for civil
causes of action based on similar principles. See, e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006).  Regarding universal civil jurisdiction, see generally Donald Francis Dono-
van & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 142 (2006).
4. For an illustration of the controversy, see the separate and dissenting opinions
and declarations in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J.
3, 40–45, 50–52, 56–57 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume, dissenting
opinion of Judge Oda, and declaration of Judge Ranjeva).
5. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tex. L.
Rev. 785, 788–89 (1988); Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 596, 599–600 (2003).
6. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 86,
90–91, 96 (2001); George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
580, 582–84 (2003).
7. Reflecting its state-centric tradition, international law is largely created through
state consent.  As such, the primary sources are custom, treaty, and the general principles
of law recognized by states.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 33(1), June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.  While not binding per se, secondary sources (e.g.,
judicial decisions and academic opinions) may be useful for interpreting the law and iden-
tifying its general principles. See id.
8. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 292 (2003) [hereinafter CAS-
SESE (2003)].  Reference is made here and elsewhere to the first edition because the sec-
tion “Legal Grounds of Jurisdiction” was removed from the second edition, which
shortened the discussion of the jurisdiction of national courts under international criminal
law. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ix (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter CAS-
SESE (2008)].
9. See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1, 4, 7.
10. As will be discussed later in this Article, individual responsibility for international
crimes has only been generally recognized since the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., CAS-
SESE (2008), supra note 8, at 4. R
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equality may be implicated when a state, through its representative,
is brought under another state’s jurisdiction.  Since officials
represent the state internationally, such prosecutions may be inter-
preted as actions against the state itself.  Rwanda recently made this
argument against the exercise of universal jurisdiction after arrest
warrants were issued in France and Spain against some of its offi-
cials: “Rwanda has been a victim of the abuse of this principle [of
universal jurisdiction] . . . by French and [Spanish] judges against
Rwanda.”11  Similarly, the African Union has recently opposed the
exercise of universal jurisdiction.12  The resistance of the African
Union to attempted prosecutions of nationals of A.U. member
states highlights the potential difficulties that exercising universal
jurisdiction may pose to international relations, and is illustrated
by Rwandan President Kagame’s stinging rebuke:
[L]ately, some in the more powerful parts of the world have
given themselves the right to extend their national jurisdiction
to indict weaker nations.  This is total disregard of international
justice and order.  Where does this right come from?  Would the
reverse apply such that a judgment from less powerful nations
indicts those from the more powerful?13
This Article will explore the issues raised in President Kagame’s
statement through an examination of the African Union reaction
to the attempted exercise of universal jurisdiction by non-African
Union states.  The African Union response is important because an
emerging “African practice” could affect the future development
of universal jurisdiction under customary international law, while
the growing view among African states that universal jurisdiction
(and the International Criminal Court (ICC)) “are the new weap-
ons of choice of former colonial powers targeting weaker African
nations” could have a chilling effect on international criminal jus-
tice.14  As the African Union reaction shows, states may view the
exercise of universal jurisdiction against their nationals—and, in
particular, their officials—as a threat to their sovereignty, while
11. Rwanda, Report on Information and Observations on the Scope and Application
of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 2 (emphasis added), available at http://
www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Rwanda.pdf.
12. See, e.g., African Union (A.U.) Ass., Decision on the Report of the Commission on the
Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.199(XI) (July
2008).
13. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, Address at the Facing
Tomorrow Conference (May 13, 2008), available at http://www.presidency.gov.rw/
speeches/156-13th-may-2008.
14. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?  A Preliminary
Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction, 21 CRIM. L.F. 1, 3–4 (2010).
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states may also hold divergent views regarding the legality of uni-
versal jurisdiction and the crimes to which it applies.15
This Article begins by reviewing jurisdiction under international
criminal law and the features of universal jurisdiction.  Part III
examines the recent African Union reaction to the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction by non-African Union states.  Part IV outlines
and assesses the arguments in favor and against universal jurisdic-
tion, while Part V considers how a proper balance may be struck
between enforcement of international criminal law through univer-
sal jurisdiction and respect for state sovereignty.  Contrary to Presi-
dent Kagame’s statement, this Article will assert that international
law provides states with the right to exercise universal jurisdiction
over certain international crimes.  Rather than disregarding inter-
national justice, lawful prosecutions based on the universality prin-
ciple may achieve justice by imposing individual responsibility for
international crimes.  It is undeniable, however, that difficulties
may accompany the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  As such,
although there may be few legal restrictions on its use, states
should adopt a balanced approach that makes universal jurisdic-
tion a useful tool for ending impunity while minimizing the risks
associated with its exercise.  Ultimately, an international agreement
may be required to resolve the outstanding disagreements sur-
rounding the doctrine; until then, states should implement univer-
sal jurisdiction legislation and exercise it with care.
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. Jurisdictional Bases
Jurisdiction has two forms: prescriptive jurisdiction and enforce-
ment jurisdiction.16  In the criminal law context, jurisdiction refers
to the state’s ability to criminalize conduct (prescriptive jurisdic-
tion) and enforce its criminal law (enforcement jurisdiction).
Enforcement jurisdiction is primarily territorial, as a state is only
permitted to enforce its law (i.e., investigate, prosecute, and pun-
ish) within its own territory, unless it obtains another state’s con-
15. U.N. Secretary-General, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdic-
tion, Rep. of the Secretary-General, 6–8, 28–32, U.N. Doc. A/65/181 (July 29, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Secretary-General’s Report on Universal Jurisdiction].
16. Another term often used is “adjudicative” jurisdiction, which refers to the author-
ity for courts to adjudicate an issue and is a subcategory of enforcement jurisdiction. See
Julia Geneuss, Universal Jurisdiction Reloaded?: Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal
Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 945, 949 (2009).
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sent to act in that state’s territory.17  Enforcement jurisdiction is
tied to territory because the power derives from—and is confined
by—state sovereignty:
It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty,
that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the
territory of another state without the latter’s consent.  Thus,
while a state may take certain measures of nonjudicial enforce-
ment against a person in another state . . . its law enforcement
officers cannot arrest him in another state, and can engage in
criminal investigation in that state only with that state’s
consent.18
Although prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction
are distinct concepts, they are nonetheless linked because the law-
ful exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is predicated on valid pre-
scriptive jurisdiction.19  In other words, a state must have the
authority to criminalize the conduct in question before enforce-
ment can be lawful.
Under customary international law,20 states may prescribe crimi-
nal laws on various bases.21  The most common is the territoriality
principle,22 under which a state may criminalize conduct commit-
ted on its territory, regardless of whether the acts are committed by
nationals or non-nationals.  In light of the principle of state sover-
eignty, this jurisdictional basis is uncontroversial.  In some circum-
stances, states may also have jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts.23
International law supports extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
in a number of instances: the nationality (or active personality)
17. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432 (1986); Inst. of Int’l Law, Krakow Resolution art. 3(b) (Aug. 26, 2005) [here-
inafter Krakow Resolution]. But see Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic
Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 740 n.18 (2004) (noting that exceptions to this rule exist
during armed conflict).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 432 cmt. b; see also M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS 179 (3d ed.
2008).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 432(1)(a).
20. Customary international law binds all states equally (with the possible exceptions
of persistent objectors and states located outside of a region where a regional customary
rule exists), and arises when there is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law” estab-
lished through consistent state practice, coupled with opinio juris sive necessitatis, namely,
the belief that the law requires the practice.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v.
Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 73–81 (Feb. 20).
21. Council of the European Union, AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction, ¶ 12, Doc. 8672/1/09/REV1 (Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter A.U.-E.U. Report].
22. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. c.
23. An often cited—although controversial—case supporting extraterritorial prescrip-
tive jurisdiction is S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept.
7).
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\43-3\JLE302.txt unknown Seq: 7 16-FEB-12 12:59
2011] Universal Jurisdiction 425
principle, which is based on the accused being a national of the
state; the passive personality principle, under which jurisdiction is
derived from the victim being a national of the state; and the pro-
tective principle,24 which vests jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts
committed by non-nationals when the state’s vital interests are at
risk.25  The final basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction is the univer-
sality principle, according to which a state has jurisdiction based on
the nature of the crime, even though the crime was committed
outside of the state’s territory by and against non-nationals, and the
state’s vital interests are not endangered.26  As such, the universal-
ity principle vests states with prescriptive jurisdiction when the
traditional bases of jurisdiction are absent.27  There may be a ten-
dency to conflate enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction, but
this distinction should be maintained.28  Universal jurisdiction may
be considered “shorthand” for “universal prescriptive jurisdiction.”29
For all jurisdictional bases, whether a state should extend its crimi-
nal law over certain activity will depend on a number of factors.30
The principles regarding jurisdiction “were established to foster
cooperative relations by avoiding and resolving conflicting asser-
tions of domestic penal authority.”31  These principles “rest on and
24. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 12; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS R
LAW § 402 cmts. e, f, g.
25. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 12 (an example of a vital interest is currency R
counterfeiting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f.  Although
controversial, states may also have prescriptive jurisdiction based on the “effects principle,”
which is related to the territoriality principle because it is “[j]urisdiction with respect to
activity outside the state, but having or intended to have substantial effect within the state’s
territory . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d.
26. For various formulations of this definition, see A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 8;
Belg., Observations by Belgium on the Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction, ¶ 2 [hereinafter Observations by Belgium], available at http://www.un.org/
en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Belgium_E.pdf; PRINCETON PROJECT
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, princ.
1(1), at 28 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES].  Not all scholars accept the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction as being well-established in customary international law. See
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44 (Feb. 14)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert) (“There is no generally accepted defini-
tion of universal jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law.”).  But see
O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 744–46 (criticizing Judge Van Den Wyngaert’s statement). R
27. This is not to say that universal jurisdiction should be considered an exception to
the other bases of jurisdiction. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 58 (1994) (arguing that universal jurisdiction should be
considered its own jurisdictional principle, rather than an exception to a rule that states
lack jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts committed by non-nationals).
28. See O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 736, 755–56. R
29. Id. at 745.
30. Id. at 738 n.12.
31. Randall, supra note 5, at 786. R
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are the typical results of a balancing of sovereignty between States
and prohibited interference with internal affairs” as they “indicate
either a meaningful link . . . which describes an internationally
legally permissible relation . . . between forum State and offence or
offender, or further international legal criteria . . . which prevent
an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction from infringing on
another State’s sovereignty.”32  Although conflicts between states
may be avoided due to enforcement jurisdiction being territorial,
this does not mean that there is a hierarchy among the bases of
prescriptive jurisdiction.33  Therefore, there may be instances when
multiple states have concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction over an
alleged crime.  This situation is readily apparent when a state
assumes jurisdiction on the basis of the universality principle, as all
states—including the territorial state and the state(s) of the victim
and perpetrator’s nationality—may enjoy jurisdiction.  With no
obligation on states to accord priority to another state in these situ-
ations,34 the potential for interstate disagreement arising in the
context of enforcement is clear.
B. The Scope of Universal Jurisdiction
1. Recognizing Universal Jurisdiction
Although universal jurisdiction has been discussed frequently in
recent years due to an increase in its use,35 the concept is not
novel.36  It was recognized—in at least a rudimentary form—as
early as the 1600s by commentators such as Grotius:
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who pos-
sess rights equal to those kings, have the right of demanding
punishments not only on account of injuries committed against
themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries
32. LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVES 23 (2003).
33. See, e.g., A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 14. R
34. Id.
35. See REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 1 (“More cases of ‘universal jurisdiction’ have been R
reported in the past decade [to 2003] than throughout the whole history of modern inter-
national law.”).
36. But see Kissinger, supra note 6, at 87 (“The very concept of universal jurisdiction is R
of recent vintage.  The sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1990, does not
contain even an entry for the term.  The closest analogous concept listed is hostes humani
generis . . . .  Until recently, the latter term has been applied to pirates, hijackers, and
similar outlaws whose crimes were typically committed outside the territory of any state.”).
Regarding the history of universal jurisdiction, see generally REYDAMS, supra note 32; Yana R
Shy Kraytman, Universal Jurisdiction – Historical Roots and Modern Implications, 2 BSIS J. INT’L
STUD. 94 (2005); Randall, supra note 5. R
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which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the
law . . . of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.37
Piracy is widely considered the original crime subject to universal
jurisdiction; all states could prosecute piracy because pirates were
an enemy of humankind (hostis humani generis) and piracy a crime
against humankind.38  Further supporting this right was the fact
that, because piracy was largely committed on the high seas, it was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of every state.39  Accordingly, all
states could prosecute piracy so it would not go unpunished for
lack of a forum.40
The concept of a crime against all humankind provides the foun-
dation for modern universal jurisdiction: if a crime transcends the
interest of a single state, this supports vesting jurisdiction over the
crime to all states.41  The criminal trials following World War II are
37. Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177,
190 (1945) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 504 (Carnegie
trans. 1925) (1612)).
38. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 5, at 794–95.  “A more accurate rationale for not limit- R
ing jurisdiction over pirates to their state of nationality relies on the fundamental nature of
piratical offences.  Piracy may comprise particularly heinous and wicked acts of violence or
depredation, which are often committed indiscriminately against the vessels and nationals
of numerous states.” Id. at 794 (footnotes omitted).  Further, piracy was “especially harm-
ful to the world at a time when intercourse among states occurred primarily by way of the
high seas, thus making piracy a concern of all states.” Id. at 795; see also Cowles, supra note
37, at 190 (noting that “brigands ‘do not belong to any state’ . . . and . . . ‘can be punished R
by any person whatsoever’” (quoting GROTIUS, supra note 37, at 504)). R
39. See REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 57–58.  The act could be deemed to occur on the R
territory of the flag state. Id. at 13.
40. See, e.g., id. at 40 (noting that lack of a forum is frequently considered justification
for universal jurisdiction); Cowles, supra note 37 at 192–94.  Despite the establishment of R
the International Criminal Court (ICC), there arguably remains a need for states to exer-
cise universal jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of univer-
sal jurisdiction).
41. See, e.g., CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 285 (“[T]he crimes over which . . . [uni- R
versal] jurisdiction may be exercised are of such a gravity and magnitude that they warrant
their universal prosecution and repression.”); Cowles, supra note 37, at 217 (“[W]hile the R
State whose nationals were directly affected has a primary interest, all civilized States have a
very real interest in the punishment of war crimes.”); Randall, supra note 5, at 826 R
(“Because of the global concern with certain heinous offenses, the world community per-
mits every state to define and punish those offenses.”).  Some commentators attribute uni-
versal jurisdiction with increased respect for individual rights. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner,
Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction – Or Is It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 199, 210–11
(2004).  Although human rights and universal jurisdiction may be animated by a shared
ethical universalism, they remain legally unrelated.  Similarly, some commentators (and
judges) link universal jurisdiction to obligations erga omnes (i.e., obligations owed by states
to all states) and jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, from which no state
may derogate. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 5, at 830; BASSIOUNI, SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND R
CONTENTS, supra note 18, at 173; R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte R
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 AC 147 (H.L.) 165 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Prosecu-
tor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
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often cited as the modern recognition of universal jurisdiction,
despite the fact that the International Military Tribunal (IMT) did
not refer to it explicitly.42  The Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal gave the IMT the power to prosecute crimes that pre-
viously were not considered crimes at an international level,
namely, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.43  Further, as U.N. Secretary-General Lie noted in 1949, in
at best an implicit recognition of universal jurisdiction,44 the IMT
stated that
[t]he Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it
is to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct
of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them
might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation
has the right to set up special courts to administer law.45
mer Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).  Despite this tendency, linking universal jurisdiction with
obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms is not supported by law, as the latter relate to
state obligations and responsibility, whereas universal jurisdiction is tied to individual
responsibility. See Randall, supra note 5, at 830. R
42. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 5, at 807–08. R
43. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 284.  Although these international crimes may not have existed prior to World
War II, the U.N. General Assembly’s unanimous endorsement of the principles of interna-
tional law recognized in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter and the IMT
Judgment may be considered recognition of such crimes. See G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/
RES/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).  With the establishment of international criminal tribunals, the
existence of international crimes is no longer controversial.
44. U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnburg Tribunal: History
and Analysis, 79–80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949).  In discussing the Court’s application of
universal jurisdiction, the Secretary-General wrote:
[W]ith some hesitation, the following alternative interpretations [of the IMT’s
Judgment] may be offered.  It is possible that the Court meant that the several
signatory Powers had jurisdiction over the crimes defined in the Charter because
these crimes threatened the security of each of them . . . On the other hand, it is
also possible and perhaps more probable, that the Court considered the crimes
under the Charter to be, as international crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of
every State.  The case of piracy would then be the appropriate parallel.  This inter-
pretation seems to be supported by the fact that the Court affirmed that the sig-
natory Powers creating the Tribunal had made use of a right belonging to any
nation.
Id. at 80; George A. Finch, The Nuremburg Tribunal and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L.
20, 23 (1947); Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference
Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 342–45 (2001); Randall, supra note 5, at 806–07; Quincy R
Wright, The Law of the Nuremburg Tribunal, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 49–50 (1947).
45. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgments and Sentences (Oct. 1,
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216 (1947) (emphasis added).  An alternative
interpretation of this statement is that the Allied Powers had assumed Germany’s powers
and were simply exercising the power that Germany—and all other states—possessed to
establish a court in which to prosecute crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory.
See Wright, supra note 44, at 50. R
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Support for universal jurisdiction may also be found in a limited
number of post-World War II state tribunal decisions.46  In In re
Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen Trial), the U.S. Nuremburg
Military Tribunal stressed that the defendants were accused “[n]ot
[of] crimes against any specified country, but against humanity”
and held that
the inalienable and fundamental rights of common man need
not lack for a court . . . .  Humanity can assert itself by law.  It has
taken on the robe of authority . . . . [I]t is inconceivable . . . that
the law of humanity should ever lack for a tribunal.  Where law
exists a court will rise.  Thus, the court of humanity, if it may be
so termed, will never adjourn.47
In 1950, Italy’s Supreme Military Tribunal noted that the univer-
sal character of “crimes against the laws and customs of war” ren-
ders them a concern of all states:
These norms . . . have a universal character, not a territorial one. . .
The solidarity among nations, aimed at alleviating in the best
possible way the horrors of war, gave rise to the need to dictate
rules which do not recognise borders, punishing criminals wher-
ever they may be. . . [The crimes] concern all civilised States, and
are to be opposed and punished, in the same way as the crimes of piracy,
trade of women and minors, and enslavement are to be opposed and
punished, wherever they may have been committed . . . .48
Higgins argues that Attorney-General (Israel) v. Eichmann49 is a
“classic example” of the exercise of universal jurisdiction,50 as the
46. For an overview of these cases, see Randall, supra note 5, at 807–10. In his article R
reviewing several key cases on this topic, Randall quotes the U.S. Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in In re List (1948), as stating that “[a]n international crime is . . . an act
universally recognized as criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international con-
cern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
that would have control over it under ordinary circumstances.” Id. at 807 (emphasis in
original).  Randall also quotes the opinion of the U.S. Military Commission at Shanghai in
In re Eisentrager (1947) as stating that “[t]he laws and usages of war are of universal applica-
tion, and do not depend for their existence upon national laws and frontiers.  Arguments
. . . that only a sovereign of the locus criminis has jurisdiction and that only the lex loci can be
applied, are therefore without any foundation.” Id. at 809–10.
47. In re Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen Trial) 15 I.L.R. 656, 663–65 (U.S.
Mil. Trib. 1948).
48. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (quoting Case of General Wagener, Rivista Penale 753, 757 (Sup. Mil. Trib. of Italy
1950)).
49. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961).
50. HIGGINS, supra note 27, at 59. But see BASSIOUNI, SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS, R
supra note 18, at 161 (discussing passive personality jurisdiction—or jurisdiction based on R
the nationality of the victim—and citing Eichmann as an example of a case in which the
court conflated universal jurisdiction with the extraterritorial reach of national jurisdic-
tion).  Bassiouni’s criticism may overlook the fact that Israel did not exist when the crimes
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Israeli District Court, relying in part on universal jurisdiction,51
convicted Eichmann of organizing and managing mass deporta-
tions of Jews and others to concentration camps in German-occu-
pied eastern Europe.  In affirming the District Court’s conviction,
the Israeli Supreme Court recognized that a state exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction “acts merely as the organ and agent of the inter-
national community and metes out punishment to the offender for
his breach of the prohibition imposed by the law of nations.”52
Cassese and Higgins separately note that the lack of protest against
this invocation of universal jurisdiction is significant because it may
signal state acceptance of the principle.53
Although decided under the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
another case widely cited as an example of universal jurisdiction is
Pinochet (No. 3).54  Hailed as “signal[ing] the birth of a new era for
human rights,”55 “a decision without precedent,”56 and a “begin-
ning for what can and should be justice without borders,”57 it was
ground-breaking because the majority of the U.K. House of Lords
held that, under the Convention, a former head of state (Pinochet
of Chile) could be extradited to a third state (Spain), for alleged
torture committed in another state (Chile) against nationals and
non-nationals of the third state while the accused held office.58
occurred, so the Jewish victims were not Israeli nationals when the crimes against them
were committed.  The issue of nullum crimen sine lege may not arise despite the fact that
Israel was not a state at the time of commission, provided that the crimes existed under
international law (which is, in itself, a controversial proposition, but one that is supported
by the IMT and post-war state tribunals). See O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 759 (“In such cases, R
all that has happened is that a municipal procedural competence has later been extended
to encompass conduct that was substantively criminal, under international law, when per-
formed.”).  The principle of nullum crimen sine lege will be infringed, however, if a state
legislates beyond what international law prescribed at the time of the offense. See Poly-
ukhovich v. Australia, [1991] HCA, 176 C.L.R. 501, 575–76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 26 (“These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind
and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offences against the law of nations itself
. . . .”).
52. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 300 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962).
53. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 293; HIGGINS, supra note 27, at 59. R
54. R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1
AC 147 (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
55. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Pinochet Decision: The Birth of a New Era for
Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1998).
56. RICHARD FALK, ACHIEVING HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (2009) (quoting HOWARD BALL, PROS-
ECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPERIENCE 232 (1999)).
57. Id.
58. See generally id. at 97–120; Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The
Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237, 237–40 (1999).
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Although not strictly a universal jurisdiction case, France’s Court
of Cassation recognized in Fédération Nationale v. Barbie that crimes
concerning all states may transcend national interests “by reason of
their nature, the crimes against humanity with which Klaus Barbie,
who claims German nationality, is charged in France where those
crimes were committed, do not simply fall within the scope of
French municipal law but are subject of an international criminal
order to which the notions of frontiers and extradition rules aris-
ing therefrom are completely foreign.”59  In similar fashion, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
recognized in Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) that crimes
“shock[ing] the conscience of mankind” transcend territorial
jurisdiction:
. . . [T]he crimes which the [ICTY] has been called upon to try
are really crimes which are universal in nature . . . and transcending
the interest of any one State The crimes with which the accused is
charged form part of customary international law and were never
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of any individual State[.]60
Although an exhaustive discussion of case law is beyond the scope
of this Article, decisions from numerous states, including Austra-
lia,61 Belgium,62 Canada,63 Germany,64 and the United States65
59. Fédéracion Nationale des Déportés v. Barbie, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 20, 1985, 78 I.L.R. 124, 130 (Fr.).
60. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdic-
tion, ¶¶ 42, 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995).  On appeal, the
ICTY upheld this application of universal jurisdiction. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on
the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 57, 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“[T]he offences . . . do not affect the interests of
one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind.”).
61. See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, [1991] HCA, 176 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.).
62. Public Prosecutor v. Higaniro, Cour d’Assises [Cour. ass.] [Court of Assizes] Brus-
sels, June 8, 2001 (Belg.), available at https://www.law.kuleuven.be/jura/art/40n1/
rechtspraak.pdf.
63. R v. Munyaneza, [2009] Q.C.C.S. 2201 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.).
64. Public Prosecutor v. Sokolovic, Bundegerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Jus-
tice], Feb. 21, 2001, 3 StR 372/00, BGHSt 46 (Ger.).
65. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[J]urisdiction is
conferred in any forum that obtains physical custody of the perpetrator of certain offenses
considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity.”); In re Extradition of
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (“International law provides that cer-
tain offenses may be punished by any state because the offenders are ‘common enemies of
mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment.’”);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The premise of
universal jurisdiction is that a state ‘may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern’ . . . even where
no other recognized basis of jurisdiction is present.”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that it had civil jurisdiction over torture committed in Para-
guay by and against Paraguayans because “the torturer has become—like the pirate and
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have recognized or proceeded on the basis of universal jurisdiction
(albeit with various conditions on its exercise consistent with
municipal legislation).66
2. Crimes Subject to Universal Jurisdiction
Although universal jurisdiction is widely accepted in principle,67
there remains a measure of debate regarding the crimes to which it
applies.  The crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are found
under customary international law.68  As such, they exist interna-
tionally regardless of whether a specific state has ratified a treaty to
this effect or incorporated the crime into its domestic law.69  As
customary law, the crimes may also evolve with state practice.70
Recognition of such evolution may be drawn from the 1986
slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”); Randall, supra
note 5, at 789. R
66. For a discussion of most of these cases and various states’ municipal universal
jurisdiction legislation, see generally REYDAMS, supra note 32, pt. II (reviewing legislative R
and judicial application of universal jurisdiction in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States); Randall, supra note 5. R
67. See, e.g., A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 23 (listing the scope of universal jurisdic- R
tion in several European Union member states); Louise Arbour, Will the ICC Have an Impact
on Universal Jurisdiction?, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 585, 587 (2003); REYDAMS, supra note 32, at R
28.
68. See A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 9 (“States by and large accept that customary R
international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the international
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, as well as over
piracy.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404, cmt. (a).  Interna-
tional treaties are sometimes used to claim that a crime is subject to universal jurisdiction,
because once there is near unanimous state agreement—and extensive and virtually uni-
form state practice by parties and non-parties—to this effect, it may achieve customary
status.  See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900.  However, codification may indicate that the crime
does not exist under customary law if it evidences state belief that it is necessary to codify
the crime because it does not exist customarily. See R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129
Recueil des Cours 27, 64 (1970) (“[P]roof of a consistent pattern of conduct by non-parties
becomes more difficult as the number of parties to the instrument increases.  The number
of participants in the process of creating customary law may become so small that the
evidence of their practice will be minimal or altogether lacking.  Hence, the paradox that
as the number of parties to a treaty increases, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate
what is the state of customary international law dehors the treaty.”).
69. Customary international law is a separate source of international law from treaties.
See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 683–85 (2009) (discussing the interplay between the customary
international law on “grave breaches” and the Geneva Convention).
70. Since customary international law is established through state practice and opinion
juris, the crimes to which universal jurisdiction applies may evolve with state practice.  For
further discussion on customary international law, see supra note 20 and accompanying R
text.
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Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which asserts as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism, even where none of the [traditional] bases of
jurisdiction . . . is present.71
This statement contrasts with the 1965 Restatement (Second),
which identified only piracy as subject to universal jurisdiction,
while it noted that other crimes of “universal interest” existed that
were not yet subject to the principle.72
Legal theorists generally agree that the crimes subject to univer-
sal jurisdiction include piracy, slavery, war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, apartheid, and torture.73  Some theorists suggest
that other crimes, most notably terrorism-related offences, are sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction; however, in light of the international
community’s continuing inability to define “terrorism,” it is likely
premature to support this conclusion.74  States are not unanimous
regarding the crimes to which universal jurisdiction does apply, as
diverse views were expressed in recent submissions to the United
Nations.75  China, for example, submitted that universal jurisdic-
tion only exists for piracy,76 while Belarus and Iraq respectively
claimed jurisdiction over ecocide77 and sabotage of international
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404.
72. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foun-
dation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184 n.8 (2004).
73. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND
BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 169–80 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the basis for uni-
versal jurisdiction over these crimes); Arbour, supra note 67, at 587 (recognizing the appli- R
cability of universal jurisdiction to “international crimes such as piracy, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, as well as genocide”).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404; but see United States
v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “the indefinite category of
‘terrorism’ is not subject to universal jurisdiction” because, “[u]nlike those offenses sup-
porting universal jurisdiction under customary international law—that is, piracy, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity—that now have fairly precise definitions and that
have achieved universal condemnation, ‘terrorism’ is a term as loosely deployed as it is
powerfully charged.”).
75. See generally A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21. R
76. China, Information from and Observations by China on the Scope and Applica-
tion of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 3, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/
sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/China_E.pdf.
77. Belr., Information from the Republic of Belarus on the Scope and Application of
the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 2, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/
65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Belarus_E.pdf.
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means of communication78 on the basis of the universality princi-
ple.  Given that the crimes subject to universal jurisdiction exist as
customary law, the divergence of state opinion has lead some com-
mentators to claim that there is no settled practice upon which to
found universal jurisdiction.79  Due to limited scope, this Article
cannot examine this issue in detail and will therefore assume that
the universality principle provides states with jurisdiction over
crimes including piracy, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and torture.80  Despite the general81 (albeit not unani-
mous) acceptance of universal jurisdiction, its scope and proper
application remain controversial.82
3. Relationship with aut dedere aut judicare and International
Tribunals
Universal jurisdiction permits states to prescribe certain conduct
as criminal; it does not oblige them to do so.83  A conventional
obligation exists for many crimes to which universal jurisdiction
78. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, Letter dated
Apr. 23, 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, at 1, U.N. Doc. PRCL/2010/124 (Apr. 28, 2010).
79. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS,
supra note 73, at 154 (“Universal jurisdiction is not as well established in . . . customary R
international law as its ardent proponents . . . profess it to be.”).
80. This assumption may be uncontroversial given the number of states that have rati-
fied the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute], and incorporated universal jurisdiction provisions into munic-
ipal law over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  Regarding torture, see
Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“[O]ne of the consequences of the jus cogens character
bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every
State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of
torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.”).
81. HIGGINS, supra note 27, at 56–57; Cowles supra note 37, at 218; Arrest Warrant of R
11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, 51 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Oda) (observing that, “[f]rom the base established by the Permanent Court’s deci-
sion in 1927 in the ‘Lotus’ case, the scope of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has been
expanded over the past few decades to cover the crimes of piracy, hijacking, etc,” but not-
ing that it was appropriate for the Court to avoid this issue in the present case).
82. See, e.g., Florian Jessberger, Universal Jurisdiction, in OXFORD COMPANION TO INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 555, 555 (Cassese ed., 2009) (“While it is beyond controversy
that states, under international law, have the right to provide for and to exercise universal
jurisdiction, it has been difficult to agree on the scope and preconditions of the universal-
ity principle.”).
83. But see Observations by Belgium, supra note 26, at ¶ 11 (“[T]here are also custom- R
ary obligations which require States to incorporate rules of universal jurisdiction in their
domestic law in order to try persons suspected of crimes of such seriousness that they
threaten the international community as a whole, such as grave crimes under international
humanitarian law.”); BASSIOUNI, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS,
supra note 73, at 158 n.34 (“International criminal law prescribes certain conduct which R
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applies, including war crimes,84 torture,85 and genocide.86  Known
as aut dedere aut judicare, states that are party to treaties embodying
the obligation undertake to criminalize certain conduct and extra-
dite to requesting states persons suspected of committing the
crime at issue or prosecute them.87  Although distinct from univer-
sal jurisdiction, the obligation remains relevant:
The obligation aut dedere aut judicare is nonetheless relevant
to the question of universal jurisdiction, since such a provision
compels a state party to exercise the underlying universal juris-
diction that it is also obliged to provide for by the treaty.  In
short, a state party to one of the treaties in question is not only
bound to empower its criminal justice system to exercise univer-
sal jurisdiction but is further bound actually to exercise that
jurisdiction by means of either considering prosecution or
extraditing.88
Further, treaties embodying the obligation may signal state
acceptance of extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts uncon-
nected to a state.89  As Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal note in their separate opinion in Arrest Warrant, this
conventional duty “opens the door to a jurisdiction based on the
heinous nature of the crime rather than on links of territoriality or
nationality.”90
states are bound to enforce”); Rome Statute, supra note 80, pmbl. (“[I]t is the duty of every R
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”).
84. Namely, grave breaches of the laws and customs of war. See, e.g., Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135.
85. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 5, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].
86. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
87. Rather than an obligation to prosecute, aut dedere aut judicare may be better
described as an obligation to enforce, as this obligation may be satisfied by the state submit-
ting the case to the proper authorities for investigation even when prosecution does not
result.  Roger O’Keefe, The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 811, 816 (2009).
88. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 11. R
89. See Randall, supra note 5, at 789. Rather than undermining the universality princi- R
ple, such treaties may be further evidence that the crimes are subject to universal jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 815–19.
90. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 46
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
Regarding the treaty basis of many crimes to which universal jurisdiction applies, see gen-
erally REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 43–68 (examining how universal jurisdiction is advanced R
by multilateral conventions); BASSIOUNI, SOURCE, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS, supra note 18, R
at 164–72 (listing various crimes defined in international conventions).
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Universal jurisdiction is also distinct from the jurisdiction of
international tribunals, such as the ad hoc tribunals created by the
U.N. Security Council (e.g., the ICTY and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) and the ICC, as the jurisdiction
of these bodies arises from conventional consent.91  With respect to
ad hoc tribunals and cases referred by the Security Council to the
ICC, consent flows from the binding nature of Security Council
decisions on U.N. member states,92 whereas the jurisdiction of the
ICC for cases not referred to it by the Security Council derives
from state consent through ratification of the Rome Statute estab-
lishing the ICC or by non-parties accepting the Court’s
jurisdiction.93
C. Universal Jurisdiction: Absolute or Conditional?
A number of commentators have identified different categories
of universal jurisdiction: narrow or conditional in contrast to broad
or absolute.94  Cassese argues that, under “conditional universal
jurisdiction,” the presence of the accused is required to prosecute,
whereas under “absolute universal jurisdiction,” any state may pros-
ecute regardless “even of whether or not the accused is in custody or at
any rate present in the forum State.”95
The separate and dissenting opinions in Arrest Warrant imply a
similar distinction,96 as the justices of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) refer to the exercise of “classical . . . universal jurisdic-
tion,”97 the “true universality principle,”98 “universal jurisdiction,
properly so called,”99 “pure universal jurisdiction,”100 and “univer-
91. See Ademola Abass, The International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction, 6
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 349, 369–72 (2006).
92. See U.N. Charter art. 25.
93. See Rome Statute, supra note 80, arts. 12(1), 13. R
94. See, e.g., REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 28–42 (explaining the development of and R
difference between “general versus limited” universality and “co-operative versus unilat-
eral” universality”); CASSESE (2003), supra note 8 at 295–91 (describing the narrow and R
broad notions of universality); Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a
Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 589, 595 (2003) (discussing the
current state of both conditional and absolute universal jurisdiction in international law);
Jalloh, supra note 14, at 7–9. R
95. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 286. R
96. See O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 735, 749, 755. R
97. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 21
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
98. Id. ¶ 31.
99. Id. ¶ 45.
100. Id.
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sal (criminal) jurisdiction in absentia.”101  While the use of such
terms may suggest that different categories of universal jurisdic-
tion—in particular universal jurisdiction in absentia—exist,
O’Keefe argues that this approach “is not logically compelling”
because it “conflates a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal
law with the manner of that law’s enforcement.”102  As noted
above, enforcement jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction are
legally distinct:103 “On the one hand, there is universal jurisdiction,
a head of prescriptive jurisdiction alongside territoriality, national-
ity, passive personality and so on.  On the other hand, there is
enforcement in absentia, just as there is enforcement in per-
sonam.”104  Determining whether it is unlawful to enforce interna-
tional criminal law in absentia remains a matter of the municipal
law of the enforcing state.105  Trials in absentia are not unknown; a
court in France, for example, recently convicted in absentia thirteen
former Chilean officials who served under Pinochet for their role
in the disappearance of four French citizens.106
Since universal jurisdiction is a subset of prescriptive jurisdiction,
“absolute” and “conditional” universal jurisdiction and “universal
jurisdiction in absentia,” insofar as they imply the existence of dif-
ferent legal categories of jurisdiction, are misleading.  Rather, the
discussion of these concepts should be considered statements
regarding how states should restrict their exercise of universal juris-
diction.  The fact that many states have imposed such restric-
tions107 should not be considered opinio juris that customary
101. Id. ¶¶ 49–59; id. ¶¶ 5, 11 (declaration of Judge Ranjeva).
102. O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 749. R
103. Judge Van Den Wyngaert maintains the distinction. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 49 (dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert).
104. O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 750. R
105. Id. at 740–41; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 56 (joint separate
opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
106. Pinochet Officials Sentenced to Jail in France, BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12021397.
107. See BASSIOUNI, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, supra
note 73, at 188–89 (“[N]ational state law and judicial practice has always required at least R
the presence of the accused in the territory of the enforcing state or whenever the victim
or perpetrator is a national of the enforcing state.”); see also, e.g., CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN] art.
136 (Belg.) (requiring Belgian nationality or residency of the accused or victim, or a treaty
obligation); Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, art. 8 (Can.)
(requiring the crime to bear some connection to a Canadian citizen, or requiring the
physical presence of the accused); Codice penale [C.p.] art. 7 (It.) (requiring nationality
or territorial connection); LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] art. 23 (B.O.E.
1985) (Spain) (requiring a link to Spanish interests or the commission of one of several
enumerated crimes). But see Donovan & Roberts, supra note 3, at 143–44 (“The infrequent R
exercise of pure universal jurisdiction is easy to understand: if the traditional connections
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international law only permits “conditional” universal jurisdic-
tion.108  This conclusion may be supported by the separate opinion
of Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant:
[N]ational legislation reflects the circumstances in which a State
provides in its own law the ability to exercise jurisdiction.  But a
State is not required to legislate up to the full scope of the juris-
diction allowed by international law. . . . National legislation may
be illuminating as to the issue of universal jurisdiction, but not
conclusive as to its legality. Moreover, while none of the national
case law to which we have referred happens to be based on the
exercise of a universal jurisdiction properly so called, there is
equally nothing in this case law which evidences an opinio juris
on the illegality of such a jurisdiction.109
In addition, as ad hoc Justice Van Den Wyngaert noted,
[t]here may be good political or practical reasons for a State not
to assert jurisdiction in the absence of the offender.  It may be
politically inconvenient to have such a wide jurisdiction because
it is not conducive to international relations and national public
opinion may not approve of trials against foreigners for crimes
committed abroad.  This does not, however, make such trials
illegal under international law.  A practical consideration may be
the difficulty in obtaining the evidence in trials of extraterrito-
rial crimes.  Another practical reason may be that States are
afraid of overburdening their court system. . . . The concern for
a linkage with the national order thus seems to be more of a
pragmatic than of a juridical nature. It is not, therefore, necessa-
rily the expression of an opinio juris to the effect that this form
of universal jurisdiction is contrary to international law.”110
Despite the fact that many states impose restrictions on the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction (such as requiring the accused to be
to the regulated conduct are absent, so, too, will be the traditional incentives to exercise
jurisdiction.”).
108. See O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 750 (“[I]t is always open to states to indicate unam- R
biguously that the international lawfulness of universal jurisdiction . . . depend[s] upon the
presence of the offender.  But, ‘the great majority of the interested states’ have not done
so, to date.”).
109. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 45 (joint separate opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal); see also ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 501 (2008) (discussing the position of the Netherlands that there
is no duty to establish absolute jurisdiction and problems may be associated with its exer-
cise, and that therefore, the Netherlands is justified in providing for conditional universal
jurisdiction domestically); Ministry of Sec. & Justice, Neth., Executive Summary, Founda-
tions for Jurisdiction with Regard to Offences Committed Abroad, at 4 (2010), available at
http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/vestiging-rechtsmacht.aspx?cp=45&cs=6796
(select “1662_Summary”) (“[T]he principle of unlimited universal jurisdiction [should be
‘unambiguously’ applied] with regard to the most serious criminal acts, which are identi-
fied in international law.”).
110. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 56 (dissenting opinion of Judge Van
Den Wyngaert); O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 757. R
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present in the state before it takes enforcement action), interna-
tional law arguably does not require such restrictions.111
D. Immunity of State Officials
Although an in-depth discussion of immunities is beyond the
scope of this Article,112 there is uncertainty regarding the relation-
ship of immunities and universal jurisdiction.  Certain state offi-
cials have traditionally enjoyed113 immunity from prosecution in
foreign states for acts committed in their official capacity.114  Given
the nature of the acts involved, a normative argument exists that
no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture—espe-
cially state officials in light of the greater moral culpability
incurred by authorizing or directing the crimes.115
The ICJ considered state official immunity in Arrest Warrant,
holding that “certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such
as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign
Affairs,” in addition to diplomatic and consular agents, enjoy
immunity from civil and criminal prosecution116 by foreign states
111. See Diane F. Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of
Transnational Justice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 214, 236 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004)
(observing that requiring a link for the exercise of jurisdiction could be viewed as “univer-
sality plus,” while respecting state sovereignty could bolster the jurisdictional claim and
lead to further state acceptance of universal jurisdiction).
112. For such a discussion, see generally ROSEANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF
STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW (2008); U.N. Secretariat, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008) (explaining the legal issues arising in connec-
tion with the immunity given state officials and the impact on this immunity by the
development of international criminal law).
113. U.N. Secretariat, supra note 112, at 39, 47, 162 (explaining that immunity of a R
state official is more precisely a procedural right of the state that it may waive).
114. See VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 112, at 105 (analyzing the relationship between state R
immunity and “functional immunity”—immunity granted to an individual prosecuted for a
state act).
115. Antonio Cassese explains, as follows:
[I]t is state officials . . . that commit international crimes . . . . They order, plan,
instigate, organize, aid and abet, or culpably tolerate or acquiesce, or willingly or
negligently fail to prevent or punish international crimes . . . . To allow these state
agents go scot-free only because they acted in an official capacity . . . would mean
to bow to traditional concerns of the international community (chiefly, respect
for state sovereignty).  In the present international community respect for human
rights and the demand that justice be done whenever human rights have been
seriously and massively put in jeopardy, override the traditional principle of
respect for state sovereignty.  The new thrust towards the protection of human
dignity has shattered the shield that traditionally protected state agents.
CASSESE (2008), supra note 8, at 307–08. R
116. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 45
(Feb. 14).
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while they hold office,117 such that issuing a warrant for the offi-
cial’s arrest would violate the issuing state’s obligations to the offi-
cial’s state.118  Once officials no longer hold office, they may be
prosecuted for acts committed prior and subsequent to holding
office and for private acts committed while they were in office.119
It is unclear if officials would be able to claim successfully that
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or torture are offi-
cial acts and therefore enjoy immunity from foreign prosecution
under the universality principle because they committed such
crimes while in office.120  Although Pinochet No. 3 was widely her-
alded as precedent-setting for finding that a former head of state
could be prosecuted for torture committed by the regime while he
held office, that the case was decided according to the language of
the Convention Against Torture,121 and should not be understood
117. See id. ¶ 61.
118. See id. ¶ 70.
119. Id. ¶ 61.
120. Indeed, there is a robust view that immunity from prosecution for acts committed
while in office is not limitless. See, e.g., Kenya, Scope and Application of the Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction, at 3, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAp-
pUniJuri_StatesComments/Kenya.pdf (“Impunity cannot be allowed to thrive at the
expense of fellow human beings . . . . State officials must realize that immunities granted to
them are not for their personal benefit, but for the pursuit of State interests.  These State
interests must also be tempered with reasonability.”); Lozano v. Italy, 1085 I.L.D.C. 2 (Cass.
2008) (It.) (holding that immunity is unavailable with respect to international crimes that
violate jus cogens norms); R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 AC 147 (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (expressing the view
that torture is not a state act); CASSESE (2008), supra note 8, at 307 n.9 (referencing the fact R
that both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium agreed in the Arrest Warrant
case that “the official status of a state agent cannot exonerate him from individual responsi-
bility for crimes committed while in office . . . .”).  The resulting uncertainty as to the
application of functional immunity for certain acts committed while in office may be caus-
ing former heads of state concern. See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill & Afua Hirsch, George Bush calls
off trip to Switzerland, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/feb/
06/george-bush-trip-to-switzerland (reporting that former US President George W. Bush
had cancelled a planned trip to Switzerland amid threats from human rights groups to
seek a warrant for his arrest for alleged torture on account of his approval of “waterboard-
ing,” or the simulated drowning, of detainees suspected of terrorism-related offences).
With regard to whether a head of state may be immune from prosecution for acts of geno-
cide, see G.A. Res. 91(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946) (suggesting that geno-
cide may be an example of an act that is not entitled to immunity because “genocide is a
crime under international law . . . for the commission of which principals and accomplices
– whether private individuals [or] public officials or statesmen . . . are punishable . . . .”);
Genocide Convention, supra note 86, art. 4 (“Persons committing genocide . . . shall be R
punished, regardless of whether they are . . . rulers, public officials or private individu-
als.”). But see Re Sharon and Yaron, 127 I.L.R. 110, 123–24 (Cass. 2003) (Belg.) (arguing
that heads of government enjoy immunity for genocide unless prosecuted before the terri-
torial or an international court).
121. R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] 1 AC 147 (H.L.) (explain-
ing that the Convention Against Torture defines the crime of torture such that state offi-
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as removing official immunity for serious international crimes per
se.
Immunities may be unpalatable to those seeking justice; how-
ever, as noted in Arrest Warrant, current and former officials who
enjoy immunity from foreign prosecution may be prosecuted by
their own states, other states if the official’s state waives immunity,
and international tribunals.122  Jalloh argues that, although “[t]he
rejection of blanket immunities for government officials that com-
mit crimes is certainly correct morally . . . immunities exist for a
reason: they are necessary to ensure smooth conduct of interna-
tional relations.  Again, as unpopular as they may be within certain
circles, we cannot live without them.”123  This argument may be less
persuasive with respect to former officials, as it is difficult to see how
upholding immunities for serious international crimes is integral
to international relations once an official leaves office.  With immu-
nities available to persons who direct and authorize serious interna-
tional crimes, the ability to end impunity through universal
jurisdiction may be severely curtailed; it may be true that “immu-
nity leads to de facto impunity.”124
III. THE AFRICAN UNION AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Although the “death” of universal jurisdiction was discussed fol-
lowing amendments restricting its use in Belgium,125 recent devel-
opments illustrate that these discussions were premature.  Since
mid-2008 the African Union has taken a hard stance against the
“abuse” of universal jurisdiction and, “more broadly, international-
ized and even international justice.”126  This response exemplifies
the potential negative effects that the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion may have on international relations and international criminal
justice in general.
A. The African Union’s Reaction
The indictment of nine Rwandan officials in France (including
Kabuye, the presidential officer of protocol) and the issuance of
cials must be involved and, since it imposes aut dedere aut judicare, immunity cannot be
available for the Convention to be coherent).
122. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61.
123. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 49. R
124. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 34 (dissenting opinion of Judge Van
Den Wyngaert); Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting
Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 911 (2007).
125. See, e.g., Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?, supra note 94, at 589. R
126. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 2. R
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forty arrest warrants for current or former Rwandan officials by a
Spanish investigative judge sparked the African Union reaction.127
“In Africa, the arrest warrants were perceived as part of a ‘legal
campaign’ against African states” and violations of Rwandan sover-
eignty and territorial integrity.128  In response, Rwanda attempted
to initiate proceedings at the ICJ, asking the Court to find that
France “has acted in breach of the obligation of each and every
State to refrain from intervention in the affairs of other States,”
and “is under a duty to respect [Rwandan] sovereignty.”129  The
case could not proceed because France refused the ICJ’s
jurisdiction.130
In July 2008, the A.U. Assembly of the Union noted that the
“abuse” of universal jurisdiction could “endanger [i]nternational
law, order and security” and declared that “[t]he political nature
and abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by judges from
some non-African States against African leaders, particularly
Rwanda, is a clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of these States.”131  It warned that the prosecutions would have
a “destabilizing effect” on “the political, social and economic devel-
opment of States and their ability to conduct international rela-
tions,” and instructed A.U. member states to not execute the
warrants.132  The Assembly further recommended that an interna-
tional body with “competence to review and/or handle complaints
or appeals arising out of abuse” of universal jurisdiction be estab-
lished; called on U.N. members to impose a moratorium on exe-
cuting the warrants until “all the legal and political issues have
been exhaustively discussed”; and requested the A.U. chairperson
to approach the European Union in order to facilitate discussions
between the two bodies “with a view to finding a lasting solution to
this problem and . . . to ensure that [the] warrants are withdrawn
and are not executable in any country.”133
As a result of African Union-European Union discussions, an
expert panel considered universal jurisdiction and issued its report
127. Id. at 29–31 (discussing France’s urging the U.N. Secretary-General to direct the
ICTR to indict Rwandan president Paul Kagame, and recounting the Rwandan govern-
ment’s reaction).
128. Geneuss, supra note 16, at 946. R
129. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 32. R
130. Id.
131. African Union (A.U.) Ass., Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 5(i)–(ii), A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.199(XI) (July
2008).
132. Id. ¶ 5(iii)–(iv).
133. Id. ¶¶ 5(v), 7, 8.
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in April 2009.134  Although the report provides a useful examina-
tion of universal jurisdiction, insight into European and African
state practice, and a range of recommendations, it did not alleviate
the African Union’s concerns; in July 2009 (and subsequently135),
the Assembly reiterated its concerns regarding the “blatant abuse”
of universal jurisdiction, expressed concern for the continuing
indictments “against African leaders and personalities,” and called
for an immediate termination of the indictments.136
B. Challenges and Benefits of the African Union Response
The African Union raised three main arguments regarding the
exercise of universal jurisdiction,137 largely centered on the indict-
ment of state officials.  First is the view that E.U. states have unfairly
targeted African leaders.138  As the African Union-European Union
Report notes, “[t]he African perception is that the majority of
indictees are sitting officials of African states, and the indictments
against such officials have profound implications for relations
between African and European states.”139  However, Africans have
not been the sole targets: eight European states have instituted or
sought proceedings under universal jurisdiction against nationals
of Afghanistan, Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Central Afri-
can Republic, Chile, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Guatemala, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Republic of
the Congo, Rwanda, Suriname, Tunisia, the United States, Uzbeki-
stan, and Zimbabwe.140  As Jalloh concludes, “when viewed in the
broader global context, the targeting of high-ranking personalities
for indictment by certain European courts . . . appears not to be
134. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21. R
135. A.U. Ass., Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 2, 5–7, A.U.
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.271(XIV) (Feb. 2010); A.U. Ass., Decision on the Abuse of the Princi-
ple of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 3–7, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.292(XV) (July 2010); see
also A.U. Ass., Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle
of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 4, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.213(XII) (Feb. 2009) (expressing
“regret” regarding the arrest warrant for Kabuye, which “creat[ed] tension between the AU
and the EU”).
136. A.U. Ass., Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 4, A.U. Doc.
Assembly/AU/Dec.243(XIII) (July 2009).
137. Jalloh, supra note 14 at 13–14. R
138. See id. In many instances, these are former colonial states, which may partly
explain the vehemence of the African Union reaction. Id. at 62.
139. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 34. R
140. Id. ¶ 26.  The eight European states that have exercised universal jurisdiction are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\43-3\JLE302.txt unknown Seq: 26 16-FEB-12 12:59
444 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 43
unique to the continent of Africa.”141  Further, most of the univer-
sal jurisdiction cases in European courts against Africans have been
instituted by private parties, almost all of them African (albeit often
supported by non-African human rights organizations).142
Second is the concern that denying immunities violates the sov-
ereign equality and territorial independence of states when their
officials are brought under the jurisdiction of the indicting state;
this “evokes memories of colonialism” for African states.143  Such
indictments may also impair the state’s ability to conduct interna-
tional relations, which would “severely constrain[ ] the capacity of
African states to discharge the functions of statehood on the inter-
national plane.”144  In accordance with Arrest Warrant, there may be
credence to the African Union’s claims that indictments of current
officials may be internationally unlawful; however, this would likely
depend upon the office held and the accused’s role representing
the state.
Third is the related concern that indictments restrict the state’s
political and economic growth.  There may be “considerable merit”
to this argument, as an indicted leader may lose domestic legiti-
macy, which “politicizes universal jurisdiction because of the air of
‘regime change’ that it takes in the generally delicate governance
environment of the post-colonial African state.”145
Exacerbating the belief that Africans have been unfair targets of
the enforcement of international criminal law is the pending pros-
ecutions of Africans before the ICC, including an indictment for
Sudanese President Al-Bashir for genocide.  Although the ICC
does not exercise universal jurisdiction, the indictments may con-
tribute to the sense that Africans are disproportionately targeted by
international criminal justice.  A danger of this view is the possibil-
ity of undermining the legitimacy of prosecutions based on univer-
sal jurisdiction and the effectiveness of the ICC.  As the Kenyan
Energy Minister recently asserted in response to the ICC prosecu-
tor proposing two cases against six Kenyans for possible crimes
against humanity during post-election violence in Kenya in 2008,146
“[i]t is only Africans from former colonies who are being tried at
the ICC.  No American or British will be tried at the ICC and we
141. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 16. R
142. See id. at 22.
143. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 37; see also Jalloh, supra note 14, at 29. R
144. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 38. R
145. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 14. R
146. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Kenya’s Post Election Violence: ICC Prosecu-
tor Presents Case Against Six Individuals for Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 15, 2010).
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should not willingly allow ourselves to return to colonialism.”147
This statement may not be mere political rhetoric; shortly thereaf-
ter, the Kenyan legislature voted to withdraw from the Rome Stat-
ute.148  The indictment of a number of sitting officials, including
the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Kenyatta, is exac-
erbating the Kenyan situation.
The argument that Africans are being unfairly targeted by the
ICC may be overstated.  Only the Kenyan situation was brought at
the behest of the prosecutor: three of the six situations before the
ICC are state-referred, while the Security Council referred the
remaining situations in Sudan149 and Libya.150 As ICC President
Justice Song recently noted, “the subject matter of the ICC’s trials
in broad terms has thus far been determined by States themselves
and not by the ICC.”151  Further, the Office of the Prosecutor is
conducting preliminary examinations outside of Africa, including
Afghanistan, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, and the Palestinian
Territories.152
Africans may be disproportionately subject to the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction for a number of reasons.153  First, enforcement
of international criminal law by foreign states under the universal-
ity principle may result from the fact that, in comparison with the
states that are exercising universal jurisdiction, many African states
have weaker judicial systems, with limited capacity, and a potential
unwillingness to prosecute.154  As Jalloh argues, “[t]his nuance
does not appear to have been reflected in the [official] A.U. discus-
sion over the issue.”155  Given increased attention on the enforce-
ment of international criminal law, such prosecutions will likely
continue until there is “a real willingness on the part of African
147. Kenya MPs Vote to Leave ICC over Poll Violence Claims, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12066667.
148. See id.
149. See Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the International Criminal Court to the United
Nations for 2009/10, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/65/313 (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter ICC Report]
(noting that the state-referred situations are Northern Uganda, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and the Central African Republic).
150. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (referring the situa-
tion in Libya to the ICC for investigation into possible crimes against humanity).
151. Sang-Hyun Song, President of the ICC, Remarks to the 19th Diplomatic Briefing
(Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F67584DE-F045-45E2-
9503-8F4D16B3DEAA/282635/RemarksPresidentEN2.pdf.
152. ICC Report, supra note 149, ¶ 66. R
153. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 16–19. R
154. Id. at 16.
155. Id. at 17.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\43-3\JLE302.txt unknown Seq: 28 16-FEB-12 12:59
446 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 43
states to prosecute the relevant crimes themselves.”156  Unfortu-
nately, this willingness may have been lacking in the past.157  Sec-
ond, due to emigration, many African victims and witnesses may be
available in outside states to bring complaints to foreign authorities
under universal jurisdiction.158  Third, and likely most important,
is the increased number and changing nature of conflicts in Africa
in relation to the rest of the world.  With over thirty since 1970, the
majority of recent conflicts have been in Africa, while
[t]he changing nature of modern warfare and mass communica-
tions also exacerbates the likelihood that African situations will
command greater investigative attention in foreign jurisdictions.
Ruthless military dictatorships, famine, abject poverty, barbaric
civil wars in which civilians were not just fair game but the only
game, widespread human rights abuses, including the commis-
sion of serious international crimes, have all regrettably become
enduring features on the continent.159
Increased international will to enforce international criminal law
coupled with the fact that Africa has suffered through a dispropor-
tionate number of brutal internal conflicts may explain, to some
extent, why Africans have been disproportionately subject to the
exercise of universal jurisdiction.
There is credence to the claim that more powerful states are less
likely to have their nationals and officials subject to extraterritorial
prosecutions—and not solely because those states have the capacity
to investigate and prosecute alleged international crimes inter-
nally.  This reality is illustrated by Belgium’s experience when a
Belgian prosecutor sought to investigate Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon for war crimes allegedly committed while he was Israel’s
defense minister in the 1980s.160  Belgium held the E.U. presidency
156. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 44. R
157. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 44–45.  Jalloh suggests that the attempt to prosecute for- R
mer Chadian President Habré may have suffered from little support from African states,
and “[w]hen viewed in the context of the AU Assembly’s recent opposition to universal
jurisdiction, it should not be surprising that continental leaders would be perceived in
Europe as having, at least temporarily, retreated from their strong anti-impunity
stance–especially when it comes to one of their own.” Id.; see also Stephen P. Marks, The
Hissène Habré Case: The Law and Politics of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
131, 137–38 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (noting that, after Habré had fled to Dakar,
neither Senegal nor Chad sought his extradition to Chad for trial); Tanaz Moghadam,
Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissène
Habré, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2008).
158. See Jalloh, supra note 14, at 18. R
159. Id. at 19.
160. For a discussion of this incident, see David A. Tallman, Universal Jurisdiction: Les-
sons from Belgium’s Experience, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES 375, 389–92 (Jane E.
Stromseth ed., 2003).
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when the investigations were proposed, and Israel indicated that it
would make it difficult for Europe to broker Middle East peace
negotiations successfully if Belgium proceeded.161  Similarly, inves-
tigations in Spain regarding alleged torture by Americans in Guan-
tanamo Bay led to “high-level political controversies between the
concerned governments,” while “diplomatic steps were immedi-
ately taken and the relevant indictments were quashed.”162  Since
Belgium and Spain restricted their universal jurisdiction legislation
following such controversies,163 it is undeniable that the identity of
the potential accused plays a role in determining whether and how
universal jurisdiction is exercised, and the prospects for its use in
the future.
As the African Union reaction has shown, hostility toward univer-
sal jurisdiction (and, generally, the enforcement of international
criminal law) can have ramifications on the effort to end impunity.
Given the territorial nature of enforcement jurisdiction, inter-state
cooperation is often a prerequisite to achieving justice; without
such cooperation, an accused located abroad may avoid prosecu-
tion (unless prosecuted in absentia).  This is currently the case for
President Al-Bashir, who remains at large and against whom some
African states are refusing to execute the ICC arrest warrant pursu-
ant to a decision of the A.U. Assembly.164  Even with prosecutions
in absentia, perpetrators will evade justice if a sentence cannot be
executed.  Ultimately, without international cooperation, ending
impunity may remain an elusive goal.
The African Union response further illustrates the risk of deteri-
orating international relations when states exercise universal juris-
diction without the support of the more closely connected state(s).
This risk is undeniably heightened when the suspect is a current or
former high-ranking official.  Rwanda, for example, supported
Belgium’s prosecution in 2001 of two Rwandan nuns for crimes
161. Id. at 391.
162. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 56. R
163. See id.  Belgium removed the ability for private parties to bring claims and intro-
duced nationality or residency requirements, see CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN] art. 136, while Spain
introduced a minimum requirement of a link to Spanish interests, see LEY ORGÁNICA DEL
PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] art. 23 (B.O.E. 1985).
164. A.U. Ass., Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), ¶ 10, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII)Rev.1 (July
3, 2009).  Not all African states share this political stance; South Africa, for instance, main-
tains that it would execute the warrant. See South Africa Warns Sudan’s Bashir to Stay Away
from World Cup Event, SUDAN TRIBUNE (May 27, 2010), http://www.sudantribune.com/
South-Africa-warns-Sudan-s-Bashir,35214.
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committed in Rwanda against Rwandans,165 and cooperated with
the conviction in Canada of a Rwandan for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes in 2009.166  In contrast, Rwanda
has fiercely criticized the arrest warrants issued for its officials in
2008,167 while a Belgian arrest warrant for the Democratic Republic
of the Congo’s minister for foreign affairs resulted in an interna-
tional row culminating in Arrest Warrant.168
A positive effect of the African Union reaction is that it may act
as a catalyst for the international community to address outstand-
ing issues regarding the most effective means of exercising univer-
sal jurisdiction.169  A tangible result of the dispute was the African
Union-European Union Report, which provided a number of rec-
ommendations regarding the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
Further, due to a Tanzanian request, universal jurisdiction was
placed on the U.N. General Assembly agenda in 2009.170  Pursuant
to a General Assembly resolution, the Secretary-General requested
member states to provide their views on the scope and application
of universal jurisdiction.171  Although only forty-four states
reported,172 this may be an important step toward formal discus-
sions and possibly developing international rules for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction.  The United Nations continues to study the
issue, as the General Assembly recently established a working
group “to undertake a thorough discussion of the scope and appli-
cation of universal jurisdiction,” which will hear submissions by
member states and observers.173  There may also be some merit to
the African Union’s calls for establishing a body with jurisdiction to
consider inter-state disputes arising from the exercise of universal
165. Introduction to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 1, 3 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (com-
menting that Rwandan officials “applauded the verdict in Belgium,” and quoting the
Rwandan justice minister as stating, “[i]t is highly positive that Belgium, a foreign country,
pursues and punishes crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda . . . . Other countries
should follow this example”); see also Luc Reydams, Belgium’s First Application of Universal
Jurisdiction: the Butare Four Case, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 428, 434 (2003).
166. See R v. Munyaneza, [2009] Q.C.C.S. 2201, ¶ 15 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.).  The pro-
ceedings included a rogatory commission in Rwanda before which 14 witnesses testified.
Id.
167. See Jalloh, supra note 14, at 36. R
168. See id. at 34; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
169. See Jalloh, supra note 14, at 65. R
170. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD
SUPPORT THIS ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE TOOL 5 (2011).
171. G.A. Res. 64/117, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/117 (Dec. 16, 2009).
172. Secretary-General’s Report on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 15, at 3. R
173. G.A. Res. 65/33, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/33 (Dec. 6, 2010).
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jurisdiction,174 as such a body could assist with dispute resolution
and avoid situations where states are unable to pursue claims at the
ICJ when the respondent state refuses to accept the Court’s
jurisdiction.175
IV. PROMISES AND PERILS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
From Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights
Watch,176 to Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State,177
there are vocal advocates on both sides of the universal jurisdiction
debate.  The African Union reaction highlights that, although the
debate has been long-standing, universal jurisdiction is of continu-
ing importance and resolving disagreements regarding its proper
exercise may become increasingly pressing.
A. The Perceived Benefits of Universal Jurisdiction
Leading international non-governmental organizations, such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are ardent advo-
cates of universal jurisdiction.178  These organizations, and many
commentators, argue that universal jurisdiction is an important
tool for ending impunity, as perpetrators of serious international
crimes may avoid prosecution due to the shield provided by state
sovereignty and the lack of international will to prosecute.  As
Macedo argues,
universal jurisdiction appears as a potent weapon: it would cast
all the world’s courts as a net to catch alleged perpetrators of
serious crimes under international law.  It holds the promise of
a system of global accountability—justice without borders—
administered by the competent courts of all nations on behalf of
humankind.179
Through universal jurisdiction, safe havens may be denied for per-
petrators of serious international crimes because they cannot evade
justice by crossing an international border.  In addition to ending
174. Jalloh, supra note 14, at 64. R
175. Consider, for example, that Rwanda was unable to pursue a claim against France
at the International Court of Justice for this reason. Id. at 32.
176. See generally Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 150
(2001).
177. See generally Kissinger, supra note 6. R
178. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENDING IMPUNITY: DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENT-
ING A GLOBAL ACTION PLAN USING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 7, 33–34 (2009); AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, supra note 170, at 5; The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights R
Criminals Abroad, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/pre-
cedent.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
179. Macedo, supra note 165, at 4. R
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impunity and denying safe havens, advocates highlight that univer-
sal jurisdiction can provide a competent forum when one would
otherwise be lacking, increase the possibility of domestic prosecu-
tions, and achieve justice when the international community is
unwilling to act.180
According to Steiner, universal jurisdiction is particularly useful
for bringing perpetrators to justice when other more closely con-
nected states (i.e., the territorial and national states) “will not or
cannot prosecute” and, in such instances it proves “essential to
bringing gross violators to justice.”181  Given the nature of armed
conflicts, particularly internal civil conflict, the territorial state may
be an impossible or ineffective forum for prosecution of interna-
tional crimes committed during the conflict.  Such states may
remain unwilling or unable to prosecute for long periods of time
due to a number of factors, including the presence of socially and
politically powerful persons responsible for the violations, on-going
unrest, and a potentially fragile justice system.182  By vesting
outside states with jurisdiction, it may be possible to overcome
domestic inability or unwillingness to prosecute.
An indirect benefit of universal jurisdiction is encouraging more
closely connected states to take their own steps to prosecute
alleged offenders.  As Orentlicher argues, “the existence or loom-
ing prospect of international tribunals, along with the credible
threat of prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction, have revital-
ized national processes of reckoning in countries afflicted by mass
atrocity.”183  This effect occurred in Chile, as proceedings against
Pinochet in Spain arguably fostered in Chilean society a sense that
Pinochet and his officials could be prosecuted domestically, not-
withstanding the lifetime immunity that Pinochet purportedly
enjoyed due to his appointment as a senator.184  Should the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction have such an effect, the ability to
achieve justice would be greatly enhanced, as domestic prosecu-
tions may, for practical reasons, be more effective than extraterrito-
180. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 178, at 14–15. R
181. Steiner, supra note 41, at 201. R
182. Id. at 223 (citing the DRC and Cambodia as examples of these factors).
183. Orentlicher, supra note 111, at 228. R
184. See id. (The proceedings had a “catalytic effect in Chile.  Many Chileans who
believed they had pressed the question of accountability as far as the political environment
could bear were inspired to reconsider their calculation . . . . Chilean officials who had
previously accepted Pinochet’s untouchability pledged that Chilean courts would dispense
justice . . . . In effect, the proceedings outside Chile helped blunt the power of General
Pinochet’s threat to unleash destabilizing force if his amnesty were ever challenged.”)
(footnotes omitted).
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rial prosecutions and could contribute to a greater sense of justice
within the affected community.185
Universal jurisdiction may also enhance the ability of victims to
seek justice, as their complaints to outside states may provide the
basis for prosecutions.  In instances where the territorial state may
be unwilling or unable to prosecute the alleged perpetrator, uni-
versal jurisdiction may be the only recourse available for victims to
seek prosecution.  Using Pinochet No. 3 as an example, the
attempted exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spain allowed vic-
tims to seek justice despite the fact that Pinochet enjoyed immunity
from prosecution in Chile.  Orentlicher argues this result was fair
because the “[s]urvivors of Pinochet’s torture chambers and
mothers of the disappeared did not make a deal with Pinochet, nor
did they accept the bargain struck by politicians.”186
Universal jurisdiction may play an important role in achieving
justice by providing an enforcement mechanism when the interna-
tional community is unwilling or unable to prosecute.  While some
argue that universal jurisdiction is not necessary in light of the
establishment of the ICC187 and ad hoc international criminal tribu-
nals, this Article contends that there remains a need for states to
exercise universal jurisdiction in order to bring perpetrators of
international crimes to justice.  Although ad hoc tribunals have
played a role in enforcing international criminal law, achieving a
consensus among the permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council to establish tribunals is not an easy task.188  Further, while
the ICC may become an integral tool to achieving justice, it will not
be a panacea.189  The Court is likely to deal with only the most
185. See id. at 228–29.
186. Id. at 229.
187. See, e.g., REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 40 (“As first conceived, this notion of the R
universality principle was a substitute for a non-existing international criminal court . . . .
Now that the ICC has been established, it would seem illogical to hold on to it and attri-
bute similar, if not broader, powers to a single State than to a treaty-based court.”).
188. See infra note 228. R
189. See, e.g., Macedo supra note 165, at 5 (observing that the existence of the ICC R
“might seem to obviate the need for universal jurisdiction, but the opposite is true.  The
jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national courts . . . . [P]rosecutions in interna-
tional courts ‘will never be sufficient to achieve justice.’  For the foreseeable future, inter-
national courts . . . face daunting challenges with very limited resources.  The resources of
the ICC will always be limited.”) (footnotes omitted); A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 28 R
(“[T]emporal, geographical, personal and subject-matter limitations on the jurisdiction of
international criminal courts and tribunals mean that universal jurisdiction remains a vital
element in the fight against impunity.”).
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serious offenders, it does not enjoy universal membership,190 and
its jurisdiction only reaches back to July 2002.191  Furthermore,
international tribunals also face limited resources; therefore,
domestic prosecutions may still have an important role to play in
bringing perpetrators to justice, as has occurred to some extent
with the ICTY and ICTR.192  Vesting international tribunals with
the sole responsibility for prosecuting crimes to which universal
jurisdiction applies when the territorial or national states are
unwilling or unable to prosecute risks effective impunity for minor
individuals who, in contrast to high-ranking officials, may be better
suited to prosecution through universal jurisdiction.193  Accord-
ingly, notwithstanding the potential for international prosecutions,
domestic prosecutions based on the universality principle may
prove  integral to achieving the goal of ending impunity for serious
international crimes.
B. The Perceived Risks of Universal Jurisdiction
Arguments against universal jurisdiction range from practical
considerations regarding the ability to properly conduct such trials
to an ensuing “tyranny of judges”194 and widespread politically
motivated prosecutions with negative implications for international
relations.  As Bassiouni cautions,
[u]nbridled universal jurisdiction can cause disruptions in
world order and deprivation of individual human rights when
used in a politically motivated manner or for vexatious pur-
poses.  Even with the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction
can be used imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions
190. There are currently 114 states parties to the Rome Statute. The States Parties to the
Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states¶arties/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2011).  Unless a non-party accepts its jurisdiction or the Security Council
refers a situation, the Court only has jurisdiction if: (i) the alleged conduct occurred on
the territory of a State party; or (ii) the accused is a national of a State party. See Rome
Statute, supra note 80, arts. 12(2), 13. R
191. See Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 126; Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http:// R
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute.htm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (noting that the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002).
192. See, e.g., Joseph Rikhof, Fewer Places to Hide?  The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prose-
cutions on International Impunity, 20 CRIM. L.F. 1, 4–5 (2009).  Eight International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cases have been transferred to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, id., while two International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) cases have been transferred to France, id., which is proceeding under universal
jurisdiction pursuant to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, r. 11bis(A)(iii), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.19 (Oct. 1, 2009).
193. See Kissinger, supra note 6, at 92. R
194. Id. at 86.
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between states, potential abuses of legal processes, and undue
harassment of individuals prosecuted or pursued for prosecu-
tion under this theory.195
Further, Steiner argues that controversial prosecutions could
undermine the principle: “If universal jurisdiction courts are seen
as ‘taking sides,’ as advancing one or another deeply contested
view about highly politicized and ideologically divisive conflicts,
they risk being viewed as fully part of political conflict and power
rather than as means of strengthening the rule of law.”196  Kis-
singer underscores that universal jurisdiction could be abused for
political purposes,197 noting that, “[i]t would be ironic if a doctrine
designed to transcend the political process turns into a means to
pursue political enemies rather than universal justice.”198
Although commentators raise many arguments against universal
jurisdiction, the most compelling may be its risk to international
relations.
A major concern with the exercise of universal jurisdiction is the
possibility of creating tensions among states,199 which has come to
fruition in the African Union context.  Cassese favors constraining
the use of universal jurisdiction due to its risk of hindering interna-
tional relations, particularly when the alleged perpetrator is a high-
ranking state official.200  He argues that in absentia prosecutions
based on universal jurisdiction (which he terms “absolute universal
jurisdiction”) may be suitable only for minor defendants:
Universal jurisdiction may be envisaged for cases involving low-
ranking military officers or other junior State agents, or even
civilians, culpable of alleged crimes such as torture, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and so on.  With regard to such per-
sons, one is at a loss to see why, if the national or territorial State
fails to take proceedings, another State should not be entitled to
prosecute and try them in the interests of the whole interna-
tional community.  With regard to these persons, the initiation
of criminal proceedings in their absence, the gathering of evi-
dence, and the issue of an arrest warrant would have the advan-
tage of making their subsequent arrest and trial possible.
Normally these persons are not well known, and their travels
abroad do not make news, unlike those of foreign ministers or
195. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspec-
tives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 82 (2004).
196. Steiner, supra note 41, at 232. R
197. Kissinger, supra note 6, at 88. R
198. Id. at 92.
199. See, e.g., David Stewart, Some Perspectives on Universal Jurisdiction, 102 AM. SOC. INT’L
L. PROC. 404, 406 (2008).
200. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 292–93. R
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Heads of State or military leaders.  Hence the only way to bring
them to trial is to issue arrest warrants so that at some stage they
are apprehended and handed over to the competent State.201
For Cassese, the risk of political disputes arising from prosecuting
state officials militates against the exercise of universal jurisdiction
for such persons.202
Like the Belgian arrest warrant leading to the dispute underlying
Arrest Warrant, the African Union reaction is an example of an
attempted prosecution of state officials sparking an international
dispute.  A further example, discussed above, is Belgium’s experi-
ence when a prosecutor sought to investigate Sharon,203 which, as
Tallman argues, illustrates that, “when a single nation attempts to
exercise universal jurisdiction over a world leader or other high-
profile individual in a controversial case, the resulting political fric-
tion can have serious domestic and international consequences.”204
Similarly, Cassese notes with respect to Arrest Warrant that, “a case
pertaining to the criminal responsibility of individuals became the
subject of an interstate dispute. . . . [T]he case was moved from an
inter-individual level to that of State-to-State relations.  This is con-
trary to the very logic of international criminal justice.”205  Morris
echoes this concern, which she views as arising from analogizing
modern crimes subject to universal jurisdiction with piracy; where
acts of piracy were usually for private gain, modern crimes subject
to universal jurisdiction are often committed or accepted by state
officials.206  As such, “[u]niversal jurisdiction over war crimes and
crimes against humanity . . . can become a source and an instru-
ment of interstate conflict, in a way that universal jurisdiction over
piracy was designed to avoid.”207
Numerous commentators express concern for the rights of the
accused when states exercise universal jurisdiction.  Fletcher, for
example, contends that “universal jurisdiction is both unwise and
unjust” because it threatens the rights of the accused.208  He argues
201. Id. at 291.
202. Id. at 289.  Compared with Cassese’s statement regarding the rationale behind
prosecuting state officials, supra note 115, this approach could result in safe havens for R
officials who, due to their likely role ordering or acquiescing to serious international
crimes, are arguably more responsible for atrocities.
203. Tallman, supra note 160, at 391. R
204. Id.
205. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 290. R
206. Morris, supra note 44, at 345. R
207. Id.
208. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 580.  For an opposing view, see Abi-Saab, supra note 5, at R
597–99.
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that, “[v]ictims clamour not for fair trials for the accused but pri-
marily for justice for themselves and others who have suffered like
them.  Anything short of perfect justice is called impunidad.”209
Fletcher identifies double jeopardy as a key risk, because an
accused may face prosecution in one state even though another
state’s courts have already ruled on the same act.210  As Randall
concedes, “expanded exercises of domestic jurisdiction over for-
eign defendants for extraterritorial acts raise difficult issues con-
cerning the rights of the accused.”211
Such risks, however, may be overstated and do not provide suffi-
cient justification for rejecting universal jurisdiction outright.  In
particular, it is unclear how extraterritorial prosecutions based on
universal jurisdiction pose an inherently greater risk to individual
rights than prosecutions based on other grounds where extradition
is sought.  To put it simply, all individuals facing extradition and
trial risk having their rights violated.  States could take steps to
ensure—to the greatest extent possible—that these rights are
respected, which could include, for example, requiring guarantees
to this effect prior to extradition.  Critics often argue that arrest
warrants and summonses to appear violate the accuseds’ right of
presumed innocence.212  However, this is not a compelling argu-
ment against universal jurisdiction because, if accepted, everyone
subject to such instruments would have this right violated regard-
less of the jurisdictional basis being relied upon for prosecution.
Ultimately, one may also question what incentive a state and its
prosecutorial and judicial systems would have for permitting
abuses of process under the guise of universal jurisdiction.  In light
of the potential that it would lead to diplomatic rows and potential
state responsibility for breaches of international law, there may be
little incentive for states to blatantly and systematically disregard
the rights of the accused.
Evidentiary problems may pose a significant hurdle to the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction because it necessarily entails prosecut-
ing crimes that occurred outside the state in which the alleged
crime was committed.  As such, practical considerations may arise
regarding the ability to conduct trials when much of the evidence
and witnesses are likely to be abroad.  In such instances, the territo-
rial state’s cooperation may be necessary to substantiate the
209. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 581. R
210. Id. at 582.
211. Randall, supra note 5, at 840. R
212. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 6, at 580. R
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charges against the suspect; however, if that state is unwilling to
prosecute, it may also be unwilling to assist with the investiga-
tion.213  As the African Union-European Union Expert Panel con-
firms, “[p]rospective evidentiary problems are a major reason why
few prosecutors in EU Member States have initiated proceedings
on the basis of universal jurisdiction to date.”214  Similar eviden-
tiary problems will exist with any exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction.  Although this is a key issue for investigative and judicial
authorities to overcome for the successful exercise of universal
jurisdiction, it does not militate against its use in principle.
Numerous other criticisms of universal jurisdiction exist.  Cas-
sese, for example, argues that it “may prompt victims of atrocities
to engage in so-called forum shopping”215 in order to bring a claim
in a jurisdiction in which it would be more likely to secure a convic-
tion.  Provided that any resulting trial is justifiable and fair, how-
ever, it is unclear how problematic forum shopping should be.
Competing priorities among states may also arise when more than
one state seeks to exercise universal jurisdiction over the same acts.
Accordingly, “the risk of inconsistent rulings [may] be great and
no one would know how to establish priorities between competing
courts.”216  While completing priorities will always exist when the
universality principle is exercised, if multiple states genuinely
desire to bring a perpetrator to justice, they should resolve this
issue amicably.  Steiner argues that a further risk is that states could
impose inconsistent laws if the definition of crimes varies between
states.217  This risk is tempered by the requirement that the munici-
pal definition of a crime must be consistent with the definition
under international law when the act was committed.218  Another
often-cited risk of states exercising universal jurisdiction is that
courts empowered to hear universal jurisdiction cases could
infringe the principle of separation of powers because, due to “the
number of diplomatically and politically high-profile cases which
would be brought before the courts, the judge would eventually
become entangled in roles normally played by the political authori-
ties.”219  This risk may also be overstated, as courts are often
213. See CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 291. R
214. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ 25. R
215. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 289. R
216. Id. at 290.
217. Steiner, supra note 41, at 219–20. R
218. See O’Keefe, supra note 17, at 759. R
219. CASSESE (2003), supra note 8, at 290. R
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required to consider politically sensitive cases.220  As Tallman
rightly envisages, difficulties may arise when domestic amnesties
are granted,221 because such amnesties would not prevent other
states from prosecuting international crimes.222
Myriad arguments may be raised against the exercise of universal
jurisdiction.  This Article argues that these criticisms—individually
and collectively—do not justify states abandoning universal juris-
diction.  Many of the risks could be minimized by states adopting
reasonable restrictions on their recourse to universal jurisdiction as
a basis for prosecution.
V. BALANCING ENFORCEMENT AND SOVEREIGNTY
A. Universal Jurisdiction as a Means to an End
Universal jurisdiction has not ended impunity for serious inter-
national crimes as its proponents have hoped; conversely, the inter-
national community has not witnessed widespread judicial tyranny.
The exercise of universal jurisdiction can give rise to problems,
which may be avoided, to some extent, by controlling its use.
When considering how states should exercise universal jurisdic-
tion, one should keep in mind the goal underpinning the doc-
trine223—accountability—while ensuring that enforcement action
is legitimate.  As Bassiouni warns,
220. This concern may be linked to U.S. principles regarding justiciability of “political
questions” and “acts of state.” See generally Deborah Azar, Simplifying the Prophecy of Jus-
ticiability in Cases Concerning Foreign Affairs: A Political Act of State Question, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL
L. & BUS. 471 (2010).
221. See Tallman, supra note 160, at 400–02. In South Africa, for example, as part of R
the attempt to address human rights violations that occurred under apartheid, individuals
were granted amnesties if they made full disclosure of certain acts associated with a politi-
cal objective to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 20(1) (S. Afr.).
222. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15, SCSL-2004-26,
Jurisdiction, ¶ 67 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 13, 2004).  Stating as follows:
Where jurisdiction is universal, a State cannot deprive another State of its jurisdic-
tion to prosecute the offender by the grant of amnesty.  It is for this reason
unrealistic to regard as universally effective the grant of amnesty by a state in
regard to grave international crimes in which there exists universal jurisdiction.
A State cannot bring into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime
against international law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and
remember.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Peru, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, ¶ (d) (May 18, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/
ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Peru_E.pdf. (“[A]mnesties granted by a State for
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are not binding on other States.”).
223. See BASSIOUNI, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, supra
note 73, at 163 (identifying two rationales for universal jurisdiction: the “idealistic” and the R
“pragmatic and policy-oriented,” with the common features that (i) there are shared values
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universal jurisdiction must not be allowed to become a wildfire,
uncontrolled in its application and destructive of the interna-
tional legal processes.  If that were the case, it would produce
conflicts of jurisdiction between states that have the potential to
threaten world order, subject individuals to abuses of judicial
processes, human rights violations, politically motivated harass-
ment, and work denial of justice.  In addition, there is the dan-
ger that universal jurisdiction may be perceived as hegemonistic
jurisdiction exercised mainly by some Western powers against
persons from developing nations.224
Given such dangers, a balance should be struck between the goals
of ending impunity and denying safe havens on one hand225 and
respecting the rights of the accused, state sovereignty, and main-
taining friendly relations on the other.
As Kissinger contends, “a universal standard of justice should not
be based on the proposition that a just end warrants unjust means,
or that political fashion trumps fair judicial procedures.”226  To
achieve this aim, he proposed a procedure for prosecuting war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity focused on the
U.N. Security Council by: (i) creating a special Security Council
subcommittee to report when systematic violations appear to
deserve prosecution; (ii) establishing ad hoc tribunals when a legiti-
mate trial in the territorial state is unlikely; and (iii) defining rules
and procedures for prosecutions, according to which the accused
“should be entitled to due process safeguards accorded in common
jurisdictions.”227  Although this proposal could make universal
jurisdiction less controversial because the Security Council would
provide a measure of legitimacy, its fundamental weakness is that
prosecutions would be subject to the approval (or at least the
acquiescence) of the permanent members of the Security Coun-
and interests within the international community; (ii) there is a need to expand enforce-
ment mechanisms in order to protect these shared values and interests; and (iii) expanded
enforcement will lead to “deterrence, prevention and retribution, and ultimately will
enhance world order, justice, and peace outcomes”); Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Develop-
ment of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (2001).
224. Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes, supra note 195, at 154–55. R
225. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 46
(Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert) (“[Universal jurisdiction’s]
raison d’être is to avoid impunity, to prevent suspects of such crimes finding a safe haven in
third countries.”); R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.)
198 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (“[T]he objective [of the Convention Against Torture] was
to ensure a general jurisdiction so that the torturer was not safe wherever he went.”).
226. Kissinger, supra note 6, at 92. R
227. Id. at 95–96.
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cil.228  Further, this procedure may be duplicative in light of the
existence ICC and the U.N. Security Council’s past practice of
establishing ad hoc tribunals.  Rather than institutionalizing univer-
sal jurisdiction, states should, as a matter of policy, impose reasona-
ble restrictions on its use.
B. Reasonable Restrictions on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
An important restriction on the exercise of universal jurisdiction
is limiting who can bring charges or have an arrest warrant issued
under the principle.  Allowing private parties to initiate prosecu-
tions may risk a greater number of politically motivated cases and
an over-burdening of court systems with cases that they may be ill
equipped to handle. Requiring the approval of the attorney gen-
eral (or similar office) or a special prosecutor to initiate proceed-
ings or issue an arrest warrant may be a reasonable restriction.229
To maintain legitimacy, it is imperative for such decision-makers to
act impartially and independently.  Further, to ensure non-arbi-
trary decisions, the authority determining whether to prosecute on
the basis of the universality principle should be required to con-
sider a number of factors, including the presence of the accused;
availability of evidence; severity of the crime; situation in the terri-
torial state (i.e., whether it is willing and able to prosecute); availa-
bility of a more closely-connected forum state; and prosecutorial
resources.230  Such restrictions are prudent and reasonable.
Although private parties would be unable to initiate proceedings
directly, they would remain able to file complaints with the proper
authorities, who would determine if proceedings are warranted.
The United Kingdom is currently introducing the requirement of
approval by the Director of Public Prosecutions of arrest warrants
in universal jurisdiction cases following the controversy that arose
228. Permanent members effectively wield a veto over such non-procedural decisions
of the Security Council because the U.N. Charter requires the affirmative vote of the Secur-
ity Council’s permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) on non-procedural decisions. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.  In practice,
acquiescence by the permanent members of such decisions is acceptable, as their absten-
tion from voting is not treated as an exercise of this veto power.  See Constantin A. Stav-
ropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council
Under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 737,
751–52 (1967).
229. Many states have this type of restriction in municipal legislation vesting their jus-
tice system with the ability to prosecute crimes based on universal jurisdiction.  There may
be questions regarding the permissibility of such restrictions under treaties that require
states to take decisions to prosecute in the same manner as other serious crimes under
municipal law.  See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 85, art. 7(2). R
230. See Broomhall, supra note 223, at 415–18. R
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when a warrant was issued for Israel’s former Foreign Minister
Livni through a private prosecution.231  Supporting this change,
Justice Secretary Clarke noted that, “[i]t is important . . . that uni-
versal jurisdiction cases should be proceeded with . . . only on the
basis of solid evidence that is likely to lead to a successful prosecu-
tion – otherwise there is a risk of damaging our ability to help in
conflict resolution or to pursue a coherent foreign policy.”232
States should also implement measures to increase the ability of
their justice systems to handle universal jurisdiction cases, includ-
ing providing appropriate training for investigators, prosecutors,
and judges, and possibly establishing specialized courts to deal with
such cases.233
As the African Union reaction illustrates, the identity of the
accused may play a key role in how states react to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the suspect’s identity should
lead to a careful consideration of whether proceedings should be
initiated on the basis of universal jurisdiction.  As Arrest Warrant
indicates, unless the state waives immunity, incumbent high-rank-
ing state officials would be immune from foreign prosecution
based on the universality principle, while even former state officials
may enjoy immunity for official acts committed while in office;
therefore, prosecutions of such persons should be postponed until
they no longer hold office.  Further, states seeking to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction over an official should consider issuing sum-
monses to appear to avoid any stigma arguably associated with
arrest warrants234 and forestall claims that the action infringes the
sovereign independence and equality of the official’s state.  Given
the probability that indicting current and former state officials may
be problematic, it may also be prudent for states to consider—in
appropriate circumstances—leaving such indictments to interna-
tional tribunals.  As Tallman argues,
231. Other controversial attempts to secure arrest warrants in the United Kingdom
include Kissinger, Livni, and Chinese Trade Minister Xilai. See New Rules on Universal Juris-
diction, U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (July 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/
newsrelease220710b.htm.
232. Id.
233. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ R11; see also, e.g., About the Canadian War Crimes R
Program, CANADIAN DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeguerre/
aboutus-aproposdenous-eng.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (stating that the purpose of the
Program “is to support Canada’s policy to deny safe haven to suspected perpetrators of war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, and to contribute to the domestic and inter-
national fight against impunity”).
234. A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶  R10. R
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high profile individuals and politically sensitive cases should ide-
ally be tried before international tribunals, such as the ICC, in
order to avoid political fallout that may have the unintended
consequences of causing nations . . . to scale back their ambi-
tious efforts to expand the reach of international legal order.235
With the weight of the international community behind them,
such proceedings may be vested with increased legitimacy and the
ability to indict persons who may otherwise enjoy immunity.236
For universal jurisdiction to be considered legitimate, it is imper-
ative that the rights of the accused be respected.  States exercising
universal jurisdiction should ensure that they respect accepted
norms of due process, and that proceedings are brought and con-
ducted fairly and impartially.  Similarly, states should abide by their
human rights obligations and refuse to extradite a suspect where
there is a risk of an unfair trial; cruel, degrading or inhuman pun-
ishment;237 or the imposition of the death penalty.238  In order to
respect the rights of the accused, before acceding to an extradition
request states should require: (i) a prima facie case to be made
out239 and (ii) guarantees that the requesting state will respect the
accused’s fundamental rights.  A corollary benefit of such an
approach may be minimizing the risk of politically motivated
prosecutions.
235. Tallman, supra note 160, at 392. R
236. Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 27(2) (“Immunities . . . which may attach to the R
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”).  Recent developments may call
into question the ICC’s efficacy in this regard.  For instance, recall the Kenyan legislature’s
decision to withdraw from the ICC in response to ICC naming six Kenyans suspected of
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction during post-election violence, Kenya MPs Vote to Leave
ICC over Poll Violence Claims, supra note 147, and the African Union’s decision that it will not R
execute the arrest warrant the ICC has issued against Sudan’s President Al-Bashir, A.U.
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII)Rev.1, supra note 164, ¶ 10. R
237. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 85, art. 3(1); Suresh v. Canada, R
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 45 (Can.); Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1832, 1855
(1997).
238. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 165, at 7.  The ICTY and ICTR must consider similar R
issues before transferring cases to national courts. International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, r. 11bis(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45 (Dec. 8, 2010); ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 192, r. 11bis(C). R
239. In some instances, such as the issuance of a European Union arrest warrant, extra-
dition between parties is streamlined such that neither a prima facie case nor executive
approval would be required. See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, pmbl., art.
1, 2002 O.J. (L 190); J.R. Spencer, Fair Trials and the European Arrest Warrant, 69 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 225, 226–27 (2010).
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An important factor in ensuring that the goals underlying uni-
versal jurisdiction are achieved in a manner that minimizes inter-
national disputes is for the principle to operate, as a matter of
policy, as a subsidiary or default jurisdiction.240  Although no for-
mal rule prevents states from exercising jurisdiction in the face of
concurrent jurisdictional claims, the appropriate authorities
should carefully consider whether it is necessary to proceed under
universal jurisdiction.  To be necessary, more closely connected
states and international tribunals should be unwilling or unable
genuinely to prosecute.241  As Jessberger argues, “universal jurisdic-
tion should be understood as a fall-back mechanism activated only
if no primary jurisdiction is willing and able genuinely to prosecute
the crime.”242  This situation occurred in Public Prosecutor v. Saric, as
Denmark successfully prosecuted a Bosnian refugee claimant
under municipal legislation for crimes corresponding to grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions after the ICTY declined
to take over the proceedings and cooperation with the territorial
state failed.243  As nothing renders internationalized prosecution
inherently superior to domestic, universal jurisdiction can be
240. Arbour, supra note 67, at 585; Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?, supra note R
94, at 595 (supporting a requirement for states with better jurisdictional bases to fail or R
refuse to act before states could exercise universal jurisdiction at 589); Austl., Views on the
Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 2, available at http://
www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Australia.pdf (“Univer-
sal jurisdiction . . . ensures that, where a serious crime of international concern has been
committed, and other States which have jurisdiction are unwilling or unable to act, and
where international courts and tribunals lack the jurisdictional or practical means of prose-
cuting the perpetrators of grave crimes, then another State may take up the action on
behalf of the international community.”); Center for Constitutional Rights v. Rumsfeld,
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 10, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 119, 120–21
(recognizing that the United States was “the primarily competent jurisdiction for the crimi-
nal prosecution as the home state of the accused” and that “there are no indications that
the [U.S.] authorities and the courts of the United States of America are refraining, or
would refrain, from [imposing] penal measures”).
241. See, e.g., Krakow Resolution, supra note 17, art. 3(c).  To avoid impunity, the state R
must have an impartial judiciary. See Orentlicher, supra note 111, at 235 (“[T]here is a R
heightened risk of impunity if, say, prosecution of a notorious dictator were left to national
courts subservient to his authority.”).
242. Jessberger, supra note 82, at 557; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. R
Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 59 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) (stating that it should be noted “that the rules governing the
jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing juris-
dictional immunities”); see also A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21, ¶ R9 (recommending that R
the territorial state should have primary jurisdiction as a matter of policy).
243. REYDAMS, supra note 32, at 128–29 (“[O]ne can say that Denmark stepped in ‘in R
default of any other State, to prevent, in the interest of humanity, an outrageous
impunity.’”).
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treated as a subsidiary jurisdiction.244  There may also be benefits
to domestic prosecution: “By averting or dispelling a culture of
impunity, in-country justice provides the surest guarantee that
human rights will be respected in the future.  Also prosecutions
undertaken by the state that bears principal responsibility for atro-
cious crimes help repay the nation’s moral and political debts to
victims.”245
In order for universal jurisdiction to operate successfully as a
subsidiary jurisdiction, the more closely connected state must be
willing and able to investigate and, where warranted, prosecute.  In
assessing this ability, states should consider factors similar to those
that the ICC must consider when determining if states parties to
the Court are willing and able genuinely to act.  These factors con-
sider whether the state is able to investigate properly and under-
take proceedings; proceedings are being (or will be) undertaken to
shield the accused from liability; there has been an unjustifiable
delay inconsistent with the intent to bring the accused to justice;
and the proceedings are being (or will be) conducted impartially
and independently and consistent with the intent to bring the
accused to justice.246
Even if restrictions such as those recommended above are
adopted, states should remain willing to prosecute where it is war-
ranted.  When states receive information regarding alleged serious
international crimes, they should investigate the claim to the
extent possible and seek cooperation from other states where nec-
essary.  States should also share information with more closely con-
nected states so that they may act.  Where a state obtains sufficient
evidence to support prosecution, and where the more closely con-
nected state proves unwilling or unable to act, the state should pro-
ceed based on universal jurisdiction.  A positive effect of such
willingness may be spurring a more closely connected state to act,
thereby ending impunity and denying safe havens to perpetrators.
Even if universal jurisdiction operates as a subsidiary jurisdiction, it
is apparent that the risk of political disputes as a result of the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction will remain as long as the more closely
connected state is reluctant to act.  In such instances, the inability
244. Rome Statute, supra note 80, pmbl., arts. 1, 17 (implicitly recognizing that the R
ICC’s jurisdiction is complementary to national jurisdictions).
245. Orentlicher, supra note 111, at 233–34; see also Tallman, supra note 160, at 402 R
(“[T]hose most immediately affected by atrocities . . . have the greatest interest in seeing
justice done and achieving it themselves.”).
246. Rome Statute, supra note 80, arts. 17(2)–(3). R
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to overcome non-cooperation will remain a fundamental problem,
which could be fatal to ending impunity.
VI. CONCLUSION: MAKING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION A
USEFUL TOOL
This Article has demonstrated that, in contrast to Rwandan Presi-
dent Kagame’s assertion noted above, the right of states to exercise
universal jurisdiction over certain serious international crimes is
generally accepted under customary international law.  Debate per-
sists regarding its proper exercise and, as the African Union reac-
tion illustrates, the exercise of universal jurisdiction has the
potential to create friction between states.  States may have valid
grounds to complain that the principles of sovereign equality and
non-interference are infringed when universal jurisdiction is exer-
cised over certain incumbent state officials.  The interference with
these principles is less clear with respect to former officials and
may be lacking when the suspect does not represent the state
internationally.
International rules or standards could dispel much of the debate
and assist with avoiding or resolving international disputes that
arise from the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  As Steiner warns,
“absent some consensus over [universal jurisdiction’s] appropriate
use and some form of regulation by hard or soft law, bitter conflict
and the use of one or another measure of economic and political
pressure will become frequent if not commonplace, particularly
when powerful states object to the trial of their own citizens.”247  As
such, “[t]he goal ought to be to seek a broad consensus over uses
and abuses and to attempt to persuade states to observe the sug-
gested boundary line between the two.”248  Although such broad
consensus may not soon occur, a positive result of the African
Union protests may be building momentum to work toward an
international agreement on the proper scope and application of
universal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, states should engage with the
issue—which is made increasingly possible due to the activities at
the United Nations—to address the African Union and critics’ con-
cerns regarding universal jurisdiction.  By taking advantage of this
opportunity, states can ensure that universal jurisdiction becomes a
247. Steiner, supra note 41, at 202. R
248. Id.
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useful tool in the fight against impunity and achieve justice for
international crimes.249
In the meantime, states can address the issue domestically.
Where they have sufficient capacity, states should enact legislation
authorizing their courts to prosecute international crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,250 and torture
based on universal jurisdiction.251  Additionally, states should pro-
vide their authorities with legislative or regulatory guidelines
regarding when and how such jurisdiction may be exercised.  Sev-
eral sets of proposed guidelines and principles exist regarding uni-
versal jurisdiction, which may provide guidance to both the
international community and states when drafting an international
agreement and municipal legislation.252  Reasonable restrictions
may include: controlling who may initiate proceedings or have an
arrest warrant or summons issued; ensuring respect for the rights
of suspects (both those before domestic courts and those for whom
extradition is sought); issuing summonses to appear rather than
arrest warrants; delaying indictment of certain state officials until
they no longer hold office and/or deferring prosecutions of cur-
rent and former officials to international tribunals; and relying on
the principle as subsidiary jurisdiction.  States should also adopt
measures to provide their authorities with the expertise and
resources necessary to investigate and prosecute properly cases
brought under universal jurisdiction.
In the Rwandan context, French and Spanish courts must
respect immunity from prosecution where it exists under interna-
tional law.  Where it does not, proceedings should continue if
there is a risk of impunity for serious international crimes.  In light
249. As with any codification exercise, there is a possibility that states could agree to
restrictions limiting the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a manner that makes ending
impunity more difficult and complicates how the principle would apply customarily.
250. Many states that have ratified the Rome Statute have already done so.  For
instance, Spain’s Organic Law of the Judiciary empowers Spanish courts to try cases of
genocide and war crimes, even if the acts occurred outside of Spain. See LEY ORGÁNICA DEL
PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] art. 23(4) (B.O.E. 1985) (Spain).
251. This may not be appropriate in some states due to a lack of legal capacity and
resources.  Accordingly, building the capacity of states to prosecute serious international
crimes remains an important aspect of achieving justice, and the efforts of bodies such the
U.N. Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group may be crucial to combating
impunity.
252. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 26; A.U.-E.U. Report, supra note 21; Krakow R
Resolution, supra note 17; Amnesty Int’l, Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective R
Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction, IOR 53/001/99 (Apr. 30, 1999); Int’l Law Ass’n., London
Conference, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human
Rights Offences, 20–22 (2000).
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of the unwillingness of Rwanda to cooperate with the proceedings,
it is questionable whether proceedings (and the execution of a sen-
tence, should a conviction be rendered in absentia) will be possible.
Ultimately, inter-state cooperation will remain invaluable to ending
impunity and denying safe havens for persons suspected of com-
mitting serious international crimes, which militates in favor of the
balanced approach advocated in this Article.  Although some peo-
ple may view the African Union’s hostility to the recent exercise of
universal jurisdiction as a setback in the struggle against impunity,
states should use this opportunity to make universal jurisdiction a
useful tool of international criminal justice.  Where prosecution of
persons suspected of committing serious international crimes is
not possible due to a lack of will or means, the international com-
munity must be willing to act—collectively or singly—to ensure
that heinous crimes that shock the conscience of humankind do
not go unpunished.
